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ABSTRACT
EXPECTATIONS FORMATION AND CAPACITY UTILIZATION:
EMPIRICAL ANALYSES
Chetan Dave, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2004
This dissertation consists of three empirical chapters. The first chapter examines the extent
to which real-world agents are rational in making quantitative expectations, an issue over
which there is much debate. In this chapter dynamic models for new plant-level survey data
are estimated in order to test rationality for manufacturing plants that report expectations of
capital expenditures. An advantage of such data is that rationality is tested in environments
where agents may not have knowledge of each others’ expectations, so strategic motives
for biases or inefficiencies are minimized. Model estimates and tests suggest that weak im-
plications of rational expectations are rejected, as are adaptive expectations. The second
chapter examines expectations formation in the economists’ laboratory as psychologists have
documented several biases and heuristics that describe deviations from Bayesian updating-a
standard assumption for economists. Indeed, Confirmation Bias predicts that individuals
will exhibit systematic errors in updating their beliefs about the state of the world given a
stream of information. This chapter examines this bias within a non-strategic environment
that motivates experimental subjects financially to provide probability estimates that are
close to those of a Bayesian. Subjects revise their estimates of the state of the world as they
receive signals. Comparing their estimates to those of a Bayesian shows that subjects display
conservatism by underweighting new information. In addition, subjects display confirmation
iii
bias by differentiating between confirming and disconfirming evidence. The third chapter
seeks to determine, through reduced-form Phillips curves estimates and a structural model,
whether the indicator relationship between capacity utilization and inflation has diminished
as in recent years high levels of capacity utilization have not led to higher inflation. In
Canada, the capacity utilization rate is benchmarked to survey data, thereby providing a
unique opportunity to empirically analyze this macroeconomic relationship. Estimates of
time-varying parameters and structural break models indicate that there have been breaks
over time in the relationship. The timings of the breaks suggest that increasing competitive-
ness and a rules-based monetary policy may help account for the demise of the relationship.
Estimates of a monopolistically competitive sticky-price model economy qualitatively lend
credence to this conjecture.
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1.0 ARE INVESTMENT EXPECTATIONS ADAPTIVE, RATIONAL OR
NEITHER?
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Theories of expectations formation have been central to the macroeconomic literature
for as long as the field has been attempting to generate business cycles in stochastic envi-
ronments. Since the introduction of Muth’s (1961) concept of the Rational Expectations
Hypothesis (REH), the theory of rational expectations has been predominant in theoretical
models of the aggregate economy. However, the hypothesis has been debated as researchers,
who have looked to field and experimental data, have found ambiguous results. This chapter
adds to the debate by examining new field data for manufacturing plants who form a central
modeling object of business cycle theories.
Field-data exercises have focused on data drawn from a small class of professional fore-
casters and generally face difficulties at two levels: the form of available data and subsequent
econometric modeling. At the data level the main issue is the representativeness of estimates
drawn from the activities of professional forecasters. At the econometric level the main issues
relate to the estimation constraints imposed by individuals forming expectations or forecasts
on the same public variable. In general, inferences have been mixed with some researchers
finding rationality to hold1 and others finding that when the econometric issues raised by
pooled forecasts are addressed, rationality tests fail2. In short, the debate is ongoing and cer-
1See Keane & Runkle (1990, 1998).
2See Bonham & Cohen (2001).
1
tainly inconclusive. This chapter adds to the discussion by providing inferences from a large
class of agents, who form quantitative expectations on the variable of capital expenditures
on machinery and equipment. The nature of the data allows not only for inference for a large
economic sector but for agents who form private expectations. Therefore the aforementioned
concerns are addressed and the debate over rationality is enthused by analysis of rich and
relevant data.
Given this motivation for testing the REH outside of financial markets, Section 1.4
provides econometric evidence, having discussed the plant-level data in Section 1.2 and the
models in Section 1.3. Section 1.5 concludes and summarizes the main results of the analysis
conducted: estimates of the standard rationality equations from the literature indicate that
rationality cannot be inferred. Using appropriate estimators it is clear that investment
expectations are neither adaptive nor rational. This result is not new for qualitative-response
data as, for example, Das & van Soest (2000) have found similar results when examining
household income expectations. Here the evidence is stronger for two reasons. First, the
data are for a variable for which private forecasts are made, thereby reducing biases induced
by strategic motives. Second, the tests conducted are for weak implications of rationality.
A strong test of rationality would test an economic model jointly with the expectations
formation process. However, tests only of the expectations formation process are carried
out, therefore rejection of these weak tests is quite a strong result. The remainder of this
section elaborates on some recent related studies and defends the validity of these weak tests.
1.1.1 RELATED LITERATURE
Recent studies have focused on data drawn for professional forecasters who are typically
active in financial markets. In financial markets it seems reasonable to assume that agents
do follow the dictates of rational expectations, in that they do not make predictable forecast
errors without due cause. Public observability of the decisions of market participants, such
as professional forecasters, can further induce a lack of observed forecastable errors. The
majority of the literature tests the REH in the form of forecast rationality, as distinct from
2
the implicit Bayesian updating procedure that generates such behavior. In particular, a large
literature in behavioral finance had noted that financial analysts may over (under) react to
information in a pattern inconsistent with the predictions of the REH3. Such results were
largely based on least-squares regressions of realizations on forecasts of a variety of variables.
However, these studies had neglected to model the information sets of professional forecasters,
implying that the least-squares techniques were biased towards rejecting the REH or falsely
accepting it. Keane & Runkle (1990, 1998) recognized the nature of the cross-correlations
inherent in forecast errors, arising from plausible assumptions on the information shared by
forecasters, the timeline of the data and other data properties. Using generalized method of
moments techniques they incorporated these data properties and then tested the REH, with
the result that forecast rationality held.
In a recent analysis, Bonham & Cohen (2001) further investigate the econometric foun-
dations of the tests conducted by Keane & Runkle (1990). In particular, their concern is
with testing rationality using either consensus (that is, averaged) or pooled cross-section
time series versions of the professional forecaster survey data. They argue that since the tar-
get time series being forecasted by individuals in the Survey of Professional Forecasters are
often integrated, individual rationality regressions must share the same coefficients across
forecasters. That is, following Zellner (1962), microhomogenaity must exist. They then
show that this microhomogenaity is crucial for tests of rationality using either consensus or
pooled data. Their microhomogenaity test results indicate that it is not necessarily a tenable
hypothesis and they conclude,
“Since individual rational expectations imply microhomogenaity in the panel, rejection
of microhomogenaity implies some degree of bias in panel forecasts.”
Therefore the debate over rationality is certainly not resolved even when it centers on
professional forecasters.
It is important to note that this entire line of research, from Zarnowitz (1985) to Bonham
& Cohen (2001), is on testing the rationality of agents who together forecast the same
3An analysis and a review of the behavioral heuristics that may be at work in financial markets is provided
by Barberis et. al. (1998).
3
public variable. The panel data employed in this chapter are fundamentally different from
those employed in such studies as they are for agents who report expectations of the same
private variable. Also, whereas these and other financial market studies concentrated on
agents whose forecasts and realizations were clearly observable to one another, the data
collected on manufacturing plants in this chapter are not of that form. Therefore cross-
correlations in forecast errors implied by what each forecaster knows about another are not
relevant for the data used below. This provides justification for the use of standard panel
data econometric techniques. However, these expectations are ‘real’ in the sense that the
agent has an economic incentive to form and report them. The data are for manufacturing
plants from Statistics Canada’s Capital Expenditures Survey (Actual and Forecast) that
requests information businesses already have on hand for internal decision making processes.
Therefore the derivation of the relevant estimating equations is different from that currently
present in the literature. In particular these data are not ‘off the cuff’ forecasts but well-
thought-out business plans. Thus, given the relevance of manufacturers’ expectations of
capital expenditures, the remaining issues relate to the specification of the reduced form
equations.
1.1.2 SPECIFICATION ISSUES
Presumably, capital expenditures are incurred in order to achieve some optimal level of
capital stocks given adjustment costs. In formulating, say, a partial adjustment model of
capital stock, a strong test of rationality is a joint test of the economic model as well as the
expectations formation mechanism. However, given that capital stock data are not available,
weak tests are carried out.
This leaves two particular considerations. The data are annual and so did not exhibit
large jumps in capital expenditures vis-a-vis output at the plant level, therefore a threshold
switching model implied by fixed costs of adjustment is not relevant. Whereas one can
imagine such threshold effects as examined by Hamermesh (1989, 1992) holding in high
frequency micro data on capital expenditures, the data used in this chapter are not of that
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form. Plots for each plant (across time), of shipments and realized capital expenditures,
showed that capital expenditures fluctuated with output. Were the level of such expenditures
relatively constant across time except in episodes of large changes in shipments, threshold
effects of capital expenditure plans changes would be relevant. However, thresholds with
respect to size variation are a possibility and are addressed in the specifications estimated.
Finally, if the true data generating process is being driven by say, gradual adjustment,
then clearly capital expenditures will reflect that fact. Thus, models are estimated that look
for weaker versions of forecast rationality, by limiting the information set with respect to
which orthogonality is sought.
1.2 THE DATA
Data were compiled from two surveys: the Capital Expenditures Survey (CES) produced
by the Investment and Capital Stock Division of Statistics Canada and the Annual Survey
of Manufactures (ASM) produced by the Manufacturing, Construction and Energy Division
of Statistics Canada. The former yielded data on capital expenditures and the latter on
shipments. Both surveys also provided categorical variables that were employed in creating
the panel dataset. The focus in this chapter is on the manufacturing classification and as a
result only records matching this industry were chosen for analysis4.
This section describes the sampling methods employed by the surveys, the variables
collected for analysis and the results of matching the surveys across time. The objective was
to obtain a panel that tracked manufacturing plants in operation over time, as defined by
the administrative variables available from the surveys.
1.2.1 SAMPLING METHODS AND SURVEY TIMING
The CES has distinct phases for each yearly sample. The first relevant phase is the
‘Actual Survey’ that requests information on capital and repair (including maintenance costs)
4The data for both surveys are proprietary to Statistics Canada.
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expenditures on construction and machinery & equipment for a fiscal year ended (in calendar
year t). This survey is mailed out in March of calendar year t + 1 so that the data are
procured after a firm’s fiscal year has ended. The next relevant phase is the ‘Preliminary
Survey’ that requests the same information as the Actual Survey, except that it also has
a expectations component. That is, businesses are asked to report their expectations for
capital expenditures for an upcoming fiscal year (that will end in calendar year t). This
survey is mailed out in October of calendar year t− 1; the timing of the phases is important
as it reflects what sort of information businesses have when making their expectations.
Figure 1 in Appendix C presents the stages of the CES, and as can be seen by the timing
represented there is some overlap between the two phases. However, by the time businesses
report expectations for the upcoming period, their fiscal year is well over implying that
the two phases are rough approximations to one step ahead expectations. Finally, firms
have an incentive to report their expectations as the editing procedure for the CES involves
contacting respondents repeatedly to ensure data quality. If reported data seem amiss with
respect to the respondents’ past reports and values from various financial statements, then
the respondent is contacted and the discrepancy is resolved.
For the available data, for every calendar year, samples of businesses are drawn from
a stratified concept of a population which represents the universe for inclusion in the CES
and ASM. Each survey draws a sample (based on industries and geographic regions) in-
dependently based on the income statement variable of gross business income. The ASM
is conducted once a year and requests information on input expenditures and output ship-
ments for the fiscal year just ended. In addition this general sampling method relies on
certain identifiers that correspond to different concepts of a measurement unit. The ASM
uses an identifier termed the Record Serial Number (RSN), and the CES uses the Universal
Identifier (UID). The RSN is a finer identifier in that it considers industries and a finer level
of geographic classification, in contrast the UID is broader. Consequently, several RSNs’
match to a single UID and since the only identifier that was available across surveys was the
UID, it was the one used to match the cross sections across time.
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An important consideration in the panel data creation is temporal constancy of the
sampling methods. The CES samples were generally static (except for occasional correction
for births and deaths) until 1992, they became dynamic with heavy rotation of businesses in
later years. This was witnessed by dramatic decreases in match rates starting in 1993. Since
the loss of units was not due to business failure but a change in the nature of the survey
methods (both in terms of sampling and the concept of an observational unit), the panel
was created for the years 1986-1992.
1.2.2 VARIABLES
The CES provided data on actual purchases of capital machinery and repairs expendi-
tures (xit) and expected purchases of capital machinery and repairs expenditures (yit) for
j ∈ J plants. Construction expenditures were not considered since what was required was
a variable on which one step ahead expectations are reasonable. Given the lumpy nature of
construction investment, construction capital expenditures would not fit that category well.
The CES also provided categorical variables that pertained to whether the unit was deemed
to be in business or not, if it had been amalgamated into another identifier etc. In effect
units that matched the concept of a manufacturing plant were kept as long as they remained
operational as defined by Statistics Canada. The ASM provided data on the value of man-
ufacturing shipments (zit), an output measure used to compute gross domestic product at
factor cost, and categorical variables used to adhere as closely as possible to the concept
of a manufacturing establishment or plant. In summary three variables (in addition to cat-
egorical variables) were taken from the CES, and one from the ASM. Further, tabulation
of the number of units falling under various two digit industry classes indicated that these
categories were well represented.
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1.2.3 THE SURVEY QUESTION AND DATA PROPERTIES
It is important to note the exact question units are answering when responding to the
surveys. In the Actual CES they are asked to report their expenditures on new capital
machinery and repairs (financial statement variables), in the expectations phase they are
asked to,
“...report the [capital expenditures on new machinery and repairs] expected to be put
in place during the [fiscal] year.”
Figures 2-29 in Appendix C present the data for each cross section from 1986 through
1992. Figures 2-15 plot expectations versus realizations as well as the 45-degree line. These
figures show that there is significant mass at the lower end of the distribution and significant
dispersion throughout the years. The plants at the lower end were further analyzed for any
behavior that was qualitatively different, the only distinguishing characteristic was a fair
amount of dispersion5. Figures 16-29 provide plots of the expectations error (εit = xit − yit)
versus individuals in each cross section. There seems to be a fair amount of dispersion here
as well. Further, both sets of figures indicate linear relationships. Table 1 in Appendix B
provides the summary statistics for the panel as a whole and confirms the dispersion noted
in the plots6.
Tables 2 and 3 in Appendix B provide the yearly sample correlations. These correlations
indicate that expectations and realizations are highly correlated, however the correlation
between past realizations and expectations errors is also high, indicating a certain degree
of persistence. In summary, despite the strong linear relationships shown in Figures 2-
29, there is strong motivation to test the REH given that the aggregate data and sample
correlations indicate a degree of persistence. The main data features to incorporate in
the econometric models are unobserved individual and time variation due to the dispersion
and possible temporal shifts in the data. The next section provides dynamic models for
5In Figures 2-29 there are two plots for each year. In the first plot all of the data are provided, in the
second, data are plotted for the lower end of the distribution.
6In the table, for a variable vit, the transformations reported are the following: ‘Overall’ is v where the
mean is taken over time and individuals. ‘Between’ is vi where the mean is taken over time only. ‘Within’
is vit − vi + v.
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several expectations formation mechanisms as derived from the two central theories used in
macroeconomic theories: the adaptive and rational expectations hypotheses.
1.3 MODELS OF EXPECTATIONS FORMATION MECHANISMS
This section provides testable models of various expectations formation mechanisms
having discussed the main estimation method. Tests of the AEH are provided first followed
by tests of the REH and a general Expectations Efficiency Hypothesis (EEH).
1.3.1 ESTIMATION METHOD
Many of the reduced form models in this chapter will take the form of dynamic random
effects panel models. In such a formulation least-squares estimates are inconsistent and
biased upwards due to the inclusion of lagged dependent variates (even if the errors are
uncorrelated). Further, for the same reason, within-groups estimates are biased downwards
and are consistent in only large T asymptotics7. In light of these issues Anderson & Hsiao
(1981) proposed an instrumental-variables estimator; however it is not efficient when T > 3
as is the case for the data in hand. As a result Arellano & Bond (1991) proposed a generalized
method of moments (GMM) estimator that first-differences the dynamic equation, and uses
lagged variates as instruments in order to obtain efficient estimates.
However, this standard GMM estimator has been shown to suffer from considerable
finite-sample bias and relatively poor precision in simulations, especially in cases where the
parameter on the lagged dependant variate tends to one. Given the undesirable characteris-
tics of the standard GMM estimator, the literature has looked towards imposing additional
assumptions on the dynamic panel in order to improve the performance of the estimates.
Of the several studies, Blundell and Bond’s (1998) restrictions on the initial conditions are
considered relatively mild, and their ‘system GMM’ estimator has been shown to outperform
7See Baltagi (2001, Chapter 8) for details.
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the standard GMM estimator both in simulations and with live data8. The restrictions em-
ployed by Blundell & Bond (1998) arise from the additional assumptions that ∆yit, ∆xit and
∆zit are uncorrelated with the unobserved random effects and that the processes are mean
stationary. These assumptions are reasonable for the data at hand, especially given the fact
that the manufacturing plants have been in operation for a fairly long time. Therefore the
Blundell & Bond (1998) estimator is employed in estimating dynamic panels9.
1.3.2 THE ADAPTIVE EXPECTATIONS HYPOTHESIS
The general theory of extrapolative expectations provides the following specification for
the relationship between expectations (yit) and realizations (xit),
yit =
∞X
j=0
wjxit−1−j (1.1)
The theory of Adaptive Expectations as stated by Keynes (1936) and interpreted by Hicks
(1939) (as cited by Lovell (1986)) adds the following to (1.1),
wj = β(1− β)j, β ∈ [0, 1] (1.2)
In which case, as Nerlove (1983) presents,
yit − yit−1 = β(xit−1 − yit−1) (1.3)
The model in (1.3) is a restricted specification, therefore the unrestricted version is to be
estimated and the restriction tested. To do so, rewrite (1.3) as follows,
yit = α0 + α1yit−1 + α3xit−1 + υi + λt + ξit (1.4)
8See Blundell, Bond & Windmeijer (2000) for a complete review of the issues in dynamic panel estimation.
9The Blundell & Bond (1998) estimator expands upon that of Arellano & Bover (1995), who were the
first to suggest a systems approach. Both estimators were employed, with little difference in the estimates.
The Blundell & Bond (1998) estimates are reported as their estimator performs well even when instruments
may be weak.
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with the test for Adaptive Expectations being whether the following restriction holds,
H0 : α1 + α3 = 1 (1.5)
where α3 = β. The empirical specification in (1.4) contains unobserved individual variation
(υi), unobserved time variation (λt) and an idiosyncratic error (ξit). Thus the specification
takes the form of a random effects dynamic panel. The assumptions placed on the random
effects and the idiosyncratic error are,
E(υi) = 0, E(υiξit) = 0, E(ξit) = 0 (1.6)
In addition, if the model is correct then the following should hold,
E(ξitξis) = 0 ∀ t 6= s (1.7)
The standard moment conditions areE(yit−s∆uit) = 0 for all t ≥ 3 and for all s ∈ [2, t−1] and
E(∆yit−1uit) = 0 for all t ≥ 3 where uit = υi+ξit. The remaining requirement of the Blundell
& Bond (1998) approach requires specification of the relationship between the independent
covariates and the error (ξit). Given that the entire information set is unaccounted for, and
assuming adaptive behavior, a natural assumption is that xit−1 and ξit should be correlated
but xit and ξit+1 should not. This implies that in addition to the moment conditions outlined
above the following are also available, E(xit−s∆uit) = 0 for all t ≥ 3 and for all s ∈ [2, t− 1].
1.3.3 THE RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS HYPOTHESIS AND EEH
Rational expectations, in the sense of Muth (1961), has led to two (related) methods
prevalent in macroeconomic model building. The first, termed the REH, replaces one-step-
ahead expectations of variables with realizations and an error. The second, termed the EEH,
treats expectational errors as being orthogonal to past information; the two hypotheses are
clearly related and therefore suggest the two tests of rationality provided below. The first
test is the standard in the literature where the Muth (1961) condition is directly estimated
and tested. The second test postulates a dynamic model of computed expectational errors
and tests for any persistence.
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1.3.3.1 THE REH The theory of Rational Expectations entails specifying the re-
lationship between expectations and realizations as,
yit = E(xit | Ωit−1) (1.8)
where Ωit−1 = {· · · , yit−1; · · · , xit−1; · · · , zit−1} is the set of information available to the
plants under consideration here. In order to convert the above relationship into a testable
regression specification, assuming that expectations and realizations are related linearly,
Muth (1961) requires first that the expectational error be distributed independently of ex-
pectations. The requirement of lack of a correlation between the error and expectations
implies a non-zero correlation of the errors with realizations. Further, Muth (1961) also
requires that errors be uncorrelated with any element of an agents’ information set in order
for the agent to be referred to as fully rational10. These requirements, given the timing of
the survey data, translate into the following regression model,
xit = α0 + α1xit−1 + α2yit + α3yit−1 + α4zit−1 + υi + λt + ξit (1.9)
The test for fully rational expectations is,
H0 : α1 = 0;α3 = 0;α4 = 0;α2 = 1 (1.10)
In order to complete the specification, assumptions (1.6) and (1.7) above are adopted. The
standard moment conditions are E(xit−s∆uit) = 0 for all t ≥ 3 and for all s ∈ [2, t − 1]
and E(∆xit−1uit) = 0 for all t ≥ 3 where uit = υi + ξit. The only remaining requirement is
specification of the relationship between the independent covariates and the error (ξit). Let
Xit denote the matrix containing yit, yit−1 and zit−1, then in order to complete the model
specification the relationship between Xit and ξit needs to be specified under the null of
rationality. Rationality would by itself imply that the regression error (ξit) be uncorrelated
with Xis for all s and t. However, given that the entire information set is unaccounted for,
a more reasonable assumption is a lack of contemporaneous correlation and correlation with
all past errors. This implies that in addition to the moment conditions outlined above the
following are also available, E(Xit−s∆uit) = 0 for all t ≥ 3 and for all s ∈ [1, t− 1].
10See Lovell (1986).
12
1.3.3.2 THE EEH The REH implies that expectational errors are unsystematic
and orthogonal to lagged information, denoted the EEH11. In order to test this version of
the hypothesis define,
εit = xit − yit (1.11)
Then rationality requires,
E(εit | Ωit−1) = 0 (1.12)
where Ωit−1 = {· · · , εit−1; · · · , zit−1} is the information set and is assumed to be linearly
related to the expectational error. In order to translate the above relationship into a testable
regression specification for rationality, Muth (1961) requires that the error be uncorrelated
with elements of the information set. The elements in the context of the present analysis
are the lagged error and lagged shipments. Thus rationality requires that in the following
regression,
εit = α0 + α1εit−1 + α4zit−1 + υi + λt + ξit (1.13)
the overall regression error be uncorrelated with known information motivating the following
test of this EEH hypothesis,
H0 : α1 = 0;α4 = 0 (1.14)
Specification (1.13) is also a dynamic panel model and the previous comments and assump-
tions regarding the error and random effects apply. The standard moment conditions are
E(εit−s∆uit) = 0 for all t ≥ 3 and s ∈ [2, t − 1] and E(∆εit−1uit) = 0 for all t ≥ 3 where
uit = υi + ξit. In order to complete the model specification the relationship between zit−1
and ξit needs to be specified under the null of rationality. Rationality would by itself imply
that the regression error (ξit) be uncorrelated with zis for all s and t. However, given that
the entire information set is unaccounted for a more reasonable assumption is a lack of con-
temporaneous correlation, and correlation with all past errors. This implies that in addition
11This particular test is similar to one for adaptive expectations, however, this specification imposes no
relation such as that in (1.2). Indeed the EEH test will reflect a degree of adaptive expectations if the data
are persistent and there is remaining residual autocovariance. The distinction allows the determination of
the degree of persistence and can account for size variation.
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to the standard moment conditions for this dynamic panel the following are also available,
E(zit−s∆uit) = 0 for all t ≥ 3 and for all s ∈ [1, t− 1].
1.3.3.3 THE EEH AND SIZE VARIATION Next, given that there is signifi-
cant dispersion in the data, the model in (1.13) must be conditioned on the fact that an error
made by a small plant is fundamentally different than that by a large plant. For example, if
a large plant makes an error of $1 million but has revenues and investment expenditures in
the hundreds of millions the error is of less consequence than if a small plant who might make
an error of $10,000 and have investment expenditures of $100,000. In order to incorporate
this feature, (1.13) may be rewritten by redefining the error as,
/it =
xit − yit
yit
(1.15)
and similarly writing z0it =
zit
yit
yielding the following model,
/it = α0 + α1/it−1 + α4z0it−1 + υi + λt + ξit (1.16)
Now the test of rationality is whether there is any persistence in errors as a fraction of
expectations.
H0 : α1 = 0;α4 = 0 (1.17)
Specification (1.16) is also a dynamic panel model and the previous comments and assump-
tions regarding the error and random effects apply. The standard moment conditions are
E(/it−s∆uit) = 0 for all t ≥ 3 and s ∈ [2, t − 1] and E(∆/it−1uit) = 0 for all t ≥ 3 where
uit = υi + ξit. In order to complete the model specification the relationship between z0it−1
and ξit needs to be specified under the null of rationality. Rationality would by itself imply
that the regression error (ξit) be uncorrelated with z0is for all s and t. However, given that
the entire information set is unaccounted for a more reasonable assumption is a lack of con-
temporaneous correlation, and correlation with all past errors. This implies that in addition
to the standard moment conditions for this dynamic panel the following are also available,
E(z0it−s∆uit) = 0 for all t ≥ 3 and for all s ∈ [1, t− 1].
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Finally it is important to note that nowhere in the hypothesis tests above is the constant
required to equal zero. Strictly speaking the constants should equal zero across the specifi-
cations. However, in order to allow unobserved heterogeneity to consist of variation common
to all plants and through time, so as to account for any asymmetries in the costs of errors,
this requirement is not imposed.
1.4 ESTIMATION RESULTS
1.4.1 ESTIMATION RESULTS I
Table 4 in Appendix B provides the estimation results for equations (1.4)-(1.16)12. For
each equation the least-squares, within-groups and system GMM estimates are provided.
In order to ensure the validity of the instruments, Sargans’ test is provided in addition to
tests for autocovariance in the residuals. For each null, the F -statistic is provided in Table
5. In evaluating the estimates two items are of interest. First the estimate of the lagged
dependent variable should lie between the OLS and Within estimates; second, the within
transformation wipes out the constant in estimation and so its’ estimate is not provided.
The GMM estimates for equation (1.4) clearly imply a rejection of the null of the AEH.
The fit is good and there does not seem to be any autocovariance in the errors; further,
the overidentifying restrictions are accepted. The GMM estimates for equation (1.9) clearly
demonstrate the precision that is gained with the system GMM estimator, however ratio-
nality is rejected. Here the maintained hypotheses of no autocovariance is rejected and the
overidentifying assumptions are not rejected. It is important to note that the GMM estimate
for α2 is closer to the overall correlation between yit and xit from Table 3. The desirable
features of the estimates of equation (1.9) are that zit−1 enters with a virtual zero coefficient;
however, there is much persistence in that the coefficient on lagged expectations is strong.
12In the table, robust standard errors are in parentheses and time dummies included in the estimation.
The Within transformation removes the constant from the specification and so is not reported. The m1 and
m2 test statistics are for tests of autocovariance of orders 1 and 2 respectively. The S test statistic is the
Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions.
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The estimates for equations (1.13) and (1.16) do not fare better in testing for rationality,
there is clearly persistence in the errors and even accounting for size variation does not
imply rationality. The results also suggest that there is some residual autocorrelation as the
test statistics for these hypotheses are low. Overall, the estimates suggest a fair amount of
persistence in expectations errors.
In addition, the autocovariance and Sargan tests for most of the equations imply that
the maintained assumptions in estimation are upheld. The important feature of the results
in Table 4 is that the correlations in Tables 2 and 3 are approximated by the GMM estimates
thereby strengthening the inferences that can be drawn. Overall, the AEH, REH and EEH
tests are rejected.
1.4.2 ESTIMATION RESULTS II
The estimation results above suggest that the AEH does not hold, expectational errors
exhibit persistence and a one-to-one relationship between expectations and realizations is
doubtful. In order to solidify these results it is necessary to estimate a weaker model for the
AEH, estimate the implied model for (1.9), and to test both in order to verify the failure of
the AEH and the implied rational expectations model for the data.
Turning first to the unrestricted AEH model in (1.3), let ∆yit = yit − yit−1, expand the
right hand side and consider the following specification,
∆yit = α0 + α1yit−1 + α3xit−1 + υi + λt + ξit
ξit = ρξit−1 + φit (1.18)
|ρ| < 1, φit ∼ iid(0, σ2φ)
with the test,
H0 : α1 + α3 = 0 (1.19)
In this specification the errors are allowed to be autocorrelated, and as the specification is
not dynamic, Baltagi & Wu’s (1999) random effects GLS estimator can be employed. If the
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null fails, then there is definitive evidence against the AEH, as then both the restricted and
unrestricted models’ null hypotheses ((1.5) and (1.19)) fail.
Next, the results from the previous section suggest persistence in errors and possible
non-orthogonality of the errors with information that should have been known. Further, the
estimation results suggest that the problem lies not in the estimates for the zit−1 coefficients
but for lagged expectations and realizations. Therefore consider the following model,
xit = α0 + α2yit + α3yit−1 + υi + λt + ξit
ξit = ρξit−1 + φit (1.20)
|ρ| < 1, φit ∼ iid(0, σ2φ)
with the test,
H0 : α2 = 1;α3 = 0 (1.21)
Finally, in order to verify the extent to which the coefficient on xit is less than one, while
allowing for autocorrelated errors, consider,
xit = α0 + α2yit + υi + λt + ξit
ξit = ρξit−1 + φit (1.22)
|ρ| < 1, φit ∼ iid(0, σ2φ)
with the test,
H0 : α2 = 1 (1.23)
Specifications (1.20) and (1.22) are weaker forms of rationality as there may be informa-
tion that plants utilized to form expectations that is unobserved; the exclusion of the lagged
dependent variable should allow for some flexibility. The estimates of these specifications
are provided in Table 6 of Appendix B13.
13Note that in the table the B −W tests reports the Baltagi & Wu (1999) locally best invariant test
statistic for the null that ρ = 0. Time dummies were included in the estimation and standard errors are
robust.
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The estimates for (1.18) clearly demonstrate that the AEH is rejected. Further, the fit
seems to be rather weak and the Baltagi & Wu (1999) (B −W ) test statistic rejects that
ρ = 0. The estimates for (1.20) indicate that ρ 6= 0 and that lagged realizations enter
positively. Rationality is clearly rejected as it is in the estimates for (1.22) as well. An
important feature of these latter estimates is that the estimate for α2 is similar to that of
the GMM estimate of equation (1.9) in the above section, however, there is considerable
persistence in the data and rationality cannot be accepted.
1.4.3 ESTIMATION RESULTS III
The estimation results presented so far indicate that the data do not seem to match the
various rationality hypotheses considered. There may be additional explanations for why
these tests are being rejected, as discussed in Section 1.1.2. The first is that plants may have
multi-year plans, rendering the lagged variables with significantly non-zero coefficients. The
second is that variation across size is not being appropriately measured, indeed it would be
useful to have a dollar figure above which plants are ‘more rational’ than those falling below
a certain threshold.
In order to address these concerns the ideal method would be to estimate a random effects
dynamic panel model with thresholds. Here the endogenously estimated threshold would
reflect size variation. However, since it is difficult to obtain consistency of such estimators
(Hansen (1999)) an alternative approach is to stack the data, assume away random effects
and estimate a threshold model without the lagged variables. For this purpose the methods of
Hansen (2000) are applicable. The method is devised for estimating linear relationships under
thresholds, where the threshold is estimated endogenously. The model under consideration
is,
xt =
⎧
⎨
⎩
β10 + β11yt + φt ∀qt > eq
β20 + β21yt + φt ∀qt < eq
⎫
⎬
⎭ (1.24)
where the variates in bold represent data that have been stacked across individuals and q is a
threshold variable. The above model was estimated with the threshold being shipments (zt)
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using Hansen (2000)’s method under heteroscedastic disturbances. The estimation results
are presented in Table 7 of Appendix B. The table indicates that above a threshold of $104
million in shipments, plants are ‘more rational’ in that they are closer to a slope estimate of
one, those below the threshold clearly fair worse.
Finally, the same model was also estimated with the absolute forecast error as the thresh-
old variable, estimates are presented in Table 7 as well. The estimates confirm a standard
intuition: those who make small errors are ‘more rational’ than those who do not. The
interesting results from both of these sets of estimates is that they are for plants who have
been in business for a long period of time.
1.5 CONCLUSION
The debate over the extent of rationality of market participants can be joined when
expectations formation mechanisms are tested with rich and relevant data. Such an exercise
has been carried out in this chapter with strong results. It is important to note that the
results of this chapter have no consequences for the general Lucas critique; rather they indi-
cate that the statistical formulation of rationality in terms of Muth’s (1961) condition does
not hold. In particular weak implications of rational expectations are tested and rejected.
A general conclusion of this chapter is that evidence from micro data can be crucial
in developing stylized facts for business cycle models. Here, tests have been provided that
clearly reject adaptive and rational expectations in their traditional forms. These results
are obtained for a large class of economic agents observed for a long time period (seven
years). Further, investment is a decision variable for which a clear expectations test can be
conducted and the results are strong both in terms of the parameter estimates and hypothesis
tests. Indeed in an earlier version of this chapter the standard first-difference estimator was
employed. The results indicated a rejection of adaptive expectations and full rationality
(equations (1.4), (1.9) and (1.13)). However, the hypothesis test for equation (1.16) was
not rejected suggesting rationality in so far as plants are able to afford it. As the standard
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first-difference estimator suffers from bias in finite samples and lacks precision, the results
are stronger with the system GMM estimator employed here. Therefore even the behavioral
hypothesis that plants are rational in so far as they balance the costs and benefits of updating
is doubtful, even when testing only a weaker version of rationality.
Finally, there are several studies that have found that agents either over-or-under estimate
both in field and experimental data. This is not a new fact. However, the finding for such a
large class of agents is important for macroeconomic models, which aim to be consistent with
micro data. Consistency with micro data using appropriate estimation techniques should,
after all, be fundamental in building aggregate models of economic behavior.
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2.0 ON CONFIRMATION BIAS AND DEVIATIONS FROM BAYESIAN
UPDATING
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Models of decision-making under uncertainty are central to theories of strategic and non-
strategic economic interactions. In environments with imperfect information economic agents
must form judgments about uncertain states of the world. These judgments, or beliefs, are
then used to evaluate alternative courses of state-contingent actions. The widespread view
in economic theory is that individuals update their beliefs based on information they receive
via the use of Bayes’ rule. Agents are assumed to posses some prior beliefs on states of the
world, a set of actions that optimize their objectives, a well-defined cost of incorrect belief
formation and knowledge of and skill in the use of Bayes’ rule. This presumption about
human behavior has been a central component of the contribution of Harsanyi (1967, 1968)
who developed the theory of strategic interaction under uncertainty, and Muth (1960, 1961)
who introduced to generations of macroeconomists and econometricians the role of rational
beliefs in closing expectational models of non-strategic economic behavior.
The rapidly developing field of behavioral economics has identified several reasons why
the above presumption on judgment under uncertainty may not provide an accurate descrip-
tion of the cognitive processes that underlie human decision-making. Many of these reasons
rely on deviations from strict Bayesian updating such as learning and cognitive heuristics
that approximate learning, as a better description of the judgment process. Of the many
biases and heuristics proposed by the literature little attention has been paid by economists
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to notions that predict systematic biases in judgment due solely to cognition errors1. This
chapter examines whether one such cognitive bias, confirmation bias, leads to systematic
errors in judgment.
Confirmation bias is defined as an agent’s tendency to seek, interpret and use evidence
in a way that is biased toward confirming his already existing beliefs or hypotheses. An
agent subject to confirmation bias will not hold beliefs that are identical to those held by
a Bayesian observer. His belief formation given new information or the opportunity to
obtain new information will be biased towards his original belief; such behavior will lead
to systematic errors in judgment. This chapter provides an experimental analysis designed
to investigate the extent to which subjects exhibit confirmation bias in forming probability
judgments about the state of the world, under economic incentives to update beliefs in a
Bayesian manner.
The next section reviews some alternatives to Bayesian updating offered by the behavioral
economics literature with the aim of briefly comparing and contrasting confirmation bias with
other heuristics. Section 2.3 provides an experimental design to test for confirmation bias
and some alternative hypotheses in the laboratory. In the experiment subjects view signals,
in the form of ping-pong balls chosen from a hidden bingo cage, drawn with replacement from
one of two sets of ping-pong balls; each set contains a different mixture of black and white
balls2. Subjects estimate the probability of each set being used based on these signals. Given
this signal-extraction environment, Section 2.4 analyzes how the experiment differentiates
between confirmation bias and other heuristics and biases. Section 2.5 presents the results
of the experiment and Section 2.6 concludes.
The main experimental results show definite non-Bayesian behavior. Conservatism (un-
derweighting of new evidence) is the major cause of deviations from Bayesian behavior; in
addition, confirmation bias is also present. Thus, this chapter provides evidence of this
particular obstacle to learning in an environment in which agents simply provide probabil-
1See Camerer (1995 pp. 608-609) for a review of cognitive biases that may act as “obstacles to learning”.
2The design incorporates various treatments with respect to the ratio of black to white balls and differently
colored balls whose color could be potentially confused.
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ity estimates, using non-emotive stimuli, while being rewarded for truthful statements and
estimates that are close to those of a hypothetical Bayesian. As such, this experimental
evidence should provide incentive for continued research into the effects of cognitive biases
in economic environments.
2.2 CONFIRMATION BIAS AND RELATED HEURISTICS
2.2.1 CONFIRMATION BIAS
The standard view of judgment under uncertainty and its relation to decision making
under uncertainty is as follows. The economic agent is presumed to begin the decision making
process with a set of prior subjective beliefs about states of the world that are updated using
Bayes’ rule as information arrives over time. These updated posterior beliefs are then used
as probability judgments that motivate a certain action or set of actions given costs of errors
and the optimization objectives.
In contrast, the psychology literature offers two suggestions towards identifying underly-
ing cognitive processes that yield confirmation bias. First, the decision maker is more likely
to seek information that can confirm a hypothesis than that which can disconfirm. Indeed,
Wason’s (1968) original experiment had subjects engaged in a unique card-selection task.
The task consisted of subjects being provided two-sided cards that they were requested to
turn over (or not) in order to confirm (or disconfirm) a pre-specified rule that the cards
followed. The experiment yielded overwhelming evidence in favor of the hypothesis that
subjects would more likely turn over those cards that could confirm the rule and not those
cards that could disconfirm. Jones & Sugden (2001) tested for confirmation bias when sub-
jects chose what information to purchase in order to make decisions. They found presence
of the bias both when subjects purchased information and when they used it for decision
making in a selection task environment. In addition, in their environment the bias persisted
even when subjects repeatedly engaged in the selection task.
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Second, the agent is more likely to make mistakes in perceiving signals or interpreting
evidence so as to support his hypothesis. Lord, Lepper & Ross (1979) and Plous (1991)
show that two subjects with opposing beliefs can interpret the same ambiguous evidence as
supporting their own position. In addition Lord, Lepper & Ross (1979) demonstrate that
agents may well ignore disconfirming evidence all together or give it less weight in judgment
making. Rabin & Schrag’s (1999) model provides a theoretical foundation to this view
within a signal-extraction framework. They demonstrate theoretically that when an agent
with confirmation bias perceives signals he/she is not only under-or over-confident relative to
a Bayesian observer, but can also suffer from “wrongness” and may not learn despite being
given an infinite amount of free information.
These analyses suggest that the cognitive processes underlying confirmation bias are as
follows. First, agents seek confirmatory evidence when evaluating competing hypotheses.
Second, agents place excessive weight, relative to a Bayesian, on the use of confirmatory
evidence in updating their beliefs. Third, agents misperceive evidence to support beliefs
even when they do not seek information. Jones & Sugden (2001) have shown that the first
behavior definitely occurs under laboratory conditions when subjects are given economic
incentives that reward unbiased behavior.
2.2.2 RELATED HEURISTICS
It is important to distinguish between confirmation bias and other heuristics3. Some
heuristics and biases are related to errors in Bayesian updating. Conservatism bias describes
situations in which all new information is insufficiently weighted in the updating process.
The opposite bias is called overreaction and involves overweighting new information. Con-
firmation bias can be distinguished from these heuristics as it overweights only confirming
evidence and underweights only disconfirming evidence. Next, anchoring and adjustment
contains conservatism in updating posteriors, in addition to the choice of incorrect initial
3The seminal exposition of the psychological issues relevant to judgment under uncertainty is provided
by Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky (1982).
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priors. Confirmation bias does not offer an explanation for the choice of the initial prior.
Next, representativeness is a heuristic that overweights samples that are representative of
one particular state of the world. It is possible for any or all of these biases that cause over-
or underweighting of new information to be present at the same time. If so, then the weight
given to any new piece of evidence will depend on which of the heuristics is operational.
All of the above heuristics expect confirming and disconfirming evidence to be treated
alike; under confirmation bias the two types of evidence are given differing weights. The
experimental design in this chapter greatly diminishes the possibility of anchoring or repre-
sentativeness and provides tests to distinguish between conservatism (or overreaction) and
confirmation bias.
Economists have analyzed some of the heuristics described above in experiments focused
on individual decision-making and in settings in which subjects interact. The main differ-
ence between the psychological and economic experiments is that in the latter subjects are
motivated financially whereas in the former there is reliance on intrinsic motivation. An
experimental analysis in which several judgment biases were jointly investigated in a group
environment was conducted by Camerer (1987). In that analysis the heuristics of represen-
tativeness, conservatism and overreaction were observed in subjects engaged in asset trades.
The economic environment was characterized by a double-oral auction and subjects were
provided with priors on states of the world as well as sample information that could be used
to update priors. An important environmental characteristic of the biases investigated in
Camerer (1987) is that subjects observed each other’s behavior. In an individual decision
making environment, Grether (1980) found that subjects making probability estimates ex-
hibited representativeness. El-Gamal & Grether (1995) formulated a statistical procedure
in which the rules of thumb actually used by subjects could be identified. They found that
subjects used Bayes’ rule, representativeness and conservatism in that order of importance.
These studies have primarily elicited responses of the following variety: “Do you think that
the [state of the world] is A or B?”. The present analysis is innovative in that it elicits
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and analyses probability judgments of the following variety4: “What do you think is the
probability of [the state of the world A]?”.
In summary, confirmation bias is investigated in an environment where agents infer states
of the world through possibly ‘ambiguous’ evidence via the use of informative signals. The
approach is to test confirmation bias as an individual phenomenon as this bias needs to
be first investigated in an environment in which subjects have a non-strategic incentive to
update in a Bayesian manner. Having characterized the bias in such an environment future
analyses can investigate the effects of this bias in strategic environments with increased
clarity.
With respect to the experimental design, the first focus is on the case in which agents
do not seek information but are provided instead with costless and clear signals. However,
confirmation bias may also exist in environments without information seeking if it is based
on misperception of signals, thus the second focus of the design is on the case in which there
are ambiguous signals. Given this dual focus ambiguity is modeled both as differing signal
correlations as well as through stimuli that by construction can be misperceived. These latter
stimuli are can be of two types, emotive and non-emotive, since confirmation bias may be
more likely with emotive stimuli given the analysis of Lord, Lepper & Ross (1979). Positive
empirical results with non-emotive stimuli will substantially increase the applicability of the
bias in theoretical and applied analyses of dynamic decision making under uncertainty5.
2.3 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
The experimental design in this chapter is inspired by Grether’s (1980) balls in the
urns experiments6. In the first treatment, two sets of black and white ping-pong balls were
4Indeed Dominitz & Hung (2003) also elicit probability judgements within the context of informational
cascades in the laboratory.
5Attempts were made to implement an emotive treatment that would be equivalent, in terms of the
experimental theatre involved, to the treatments with non-emotive stimuli. However, pilot tests indicated
that subjects did not view the draws in the emotive treatment as being random relative to the non-emotive
treatment. Planned future work will incorporate this feature.
6See Appendix A for the instructions given to subjects.
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employed. The “more black” set had seven black balls and three white balls and the “more
white” set had three black balls and three white balls. The second treatment had six black
balls and four white balls in the “more black” set and four black balls and six white balls in
the “more white” set. The third treatment had seven dark gray balls and three light gray balls
in the “more dark” set and three dark gray balls and seven light gray balls in the “more light”
set. These treatments are referred to as the 70/30 Black/White treatment (or Treatment A),
the 60/40 Black/White treatment (or Treatment B), and the 70/30 Dark/Light treatment
(or Treatment C) respectively.
For each round, one set was selected at random and placed in a covered bingo cage.
Subjects then recorded their probability estimates for the chance that the set in the bingo
cage was “more black” and the chance that it was “more white”. Ten balls were drawn with
replacement from the bingo cage. For the Black/White treatments (but not the Dark/Light
treatments) the experimenter announced the color of the ball. After each draw, the subjects
recorded the color of the ball and their new probability estimates on their record sheets.
After all ten draws, the bingo cage was uncovered to reveal which set of balls had been used.
Each session began with a practice round where the procedure was demonstrated in the
front of the room. The six rounds of the actual experiment were shown on videotape so that
multiple experimental sessions could be conducted using the same sequence of draws.
A pilot, with payment in candy, run on one of the author’s classes induced some limits
on the sequences of draws that were videotaped. First, the subjects lost interest after six or
seven rounds, so six rounds were used for the experiment. Second, some randomly generated
sequences contained few or no cases of confirming and disconfirming evidence, so sequences
were limited to those that had at least two cases each of confirming and disconfirming
evidence. Six randomly generated sequences were used, which met this criterion from the
70/30 Black/White treatment. It was imperative that the subjects to see the same signals
for each treatment. So many procedures were taped until the same or symmetric (black and
white reversed) sequences for the other two treatments were obtained.
After all six rounds, one draw from one round was randomly selected for the payoff
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calculation. The payoff mechanism was designed to induce risk neutrality and truth telling
about the probability estimates. Subjects played one of two gambles in order to receive
monetary payoffs. Gamble 1 (G1) was based on the subject’s reported probability estimate
for the payoff round and draw. If the set in the bingo cage was the one they estimated as
more likely, the subject received a $15 payment in addition to the $5 show up fee. Gamble
2 (G1) was based on a set of two randomly generated numbers. The “lucky number” was
selected by drawing from a set of ping-pong balls numbered from 51 to 100. Then two ten
sided dice were rolled to generate another number from 1 to 100. If the dice roll was less
than or equal to the “lucky number”, the subject received the $15 payment. The subject’s
expected probability of winning the first gamble was his or her estimated probability of
the more likely set. The subject’s expected probability of winning the second gamble is
the “lucky number” divided by one hundred. The subject played whichever gamble had the
higher reported probability of winning for him or her, so the mechanism induced truth telling
regardless of the subject’s risk preference7.
2.4 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
2.4.1 FRAMEWORK SUMMARY
A perfectly Bayesian subject would calculate the probability of the “more black” set
being in the bingo cage after draw t, as,
Pt(more black | bt, wt) = θ
(bt−wt)
θ(bt−wt) + (1− θ)(bt−wt) (2.1)
where the proportion of black in the “more black” set is θ and in the “more white set is
1−θ, and b black balls and w white balls have been drawn8. It is important to note that the
Bayesian does not care about the order of the draws of the balls. Each time the Bayesian sees
7Figure 30 in Appendix C illustrates the payoff procedure.
8See Edwards (1982) for an example of psychology experiments in this genre.
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another draw, the quantity (bt −wt) will increase by exactly one. In this perfectly Bayesian
environment the log of the odds ratio is given by,
πt = ln
µ
Pt(more black | bt, wt)
Pt(more white | bt, wt)
¶
= (bt − wt) ln
µ
θ
1− θ
¶
(2.2)
and it is seen that for the Bayesian, the log odds ratio is linear in balls drawn. In the 70/30
treatments, πt = (bt − wt) × 0.847, and after each new draw, the log odds ratio will be
updated by ±0.847. In the 60/40 treatment the update amount is 0.405. Clearly if subjects
deviate from Bayesian behavior due to employment of the conservatism heuristic, one would
expect to see consistently smaller updates. If subjects overreact, the update of the log odds
will be greater than 0.847 (or 0.405).
Bayesians will always estimate the probability before the first draw as 50%−50% or even
odds. If subjects are using the anchoring and adjustment heuristic, they will not necessarily
start at even odds. In the pilot data it was found that many students held a belief in the
gambler’s fallacy: if the set in the previous round was “more black”, the current round was
more likely to use “more white”. Or they believed in the hot hands fallacy - that gambling
follows a run of luck - if the set in the previous round was “more black”, this round was
also more likely to use “more black”. Regardless of their initial belief, subjects using the
anchoring and adjustment heuristic will update their probability estimate in the proper
direction after each draw.
In order to reduce the possibility of subjects using the representativeness bias the exper-
iment employed ten balls in each set and ten draws. Only the last draw could possibly be
representative of either set.
A subject exhibits confirmation bias in this experiment is he/she perceives or uses new
information differently depending on whether it confirms or disconfirms his/her previously
held belief. One can tell whether the information is confirming based on the prior odds
reported by the subject. If πit−1 > 0, then the subject believes the bingo cage is more
likely to contain the “more black” set than the “more white” set. In this case, a black ball
would be confirming information and a white ball would be disconfirming information. If the
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prior log odds indicate that the subject believes both sets to be equally likely (πit−1 = 0),
then this was referred to as the neutral case, regardless of what color ball is drawn. Note
that the same information can yield different information conditions for different subjects,
if their prior beliefs differ. A black ball will be confirming to a subject whose prior odds
were 70% “more black”, neutral to a subject whose prior odds were 50% “more black”, and
disconfirming to a subject whose prior odds were 45% “more black”.
A subject may very likely exhibit more than one bias. The key to identifying confirmation
bias is to find differences in the subject’s behavior for the different information conditions.
Rabin & Schrag (1999) put forth an explanation for confirmation bias as arising from the
misperception of the signal. One can test for this effect by contrasting the Black/White
treatment, where the signal cannot be misperceived with the Dark/Light treatment where
misperception is possible. Their model also implies that the weaker the correlation between
the signal and the state of the world, the more likely confirmation bias is to lead agents astray.
To test for this effect two treatments using more (70/30) and less (60/40) correlated signals
were employed. The remainder of this section outlines in detail the data manipulations for
the reported results.
2.4.2 MODEL SPECIFICATION AND INTERPRETATION
The experimental design provides data on subjects’ probability reports. Denoting sub-
jects by i, draws within a round by t and the more black set as A the following log-odds
ratio is constructed,
eπit = logµ P (A | St)it
1− P (A | St)it
¶
(2.3)
where St = {st, ..., s0} denotes the history of signals (B(lack) or W (hite)) at each draw. The
data are truncated to lie in the [0.05, 0.95] interval so that the above ratio is meaningful9.
Next a variable is constructed that measures whether subjects think a B or W signal is more
9Some subjects did report probabilities of 0 and 1, however, alternate truncation assumptions did not
change the results significantly.
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likely for the next draw, as follows,
Eit =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
B if P (A | St−1)it−1 > 0.5
W if P (A | St−1)it−1 < 0.5
N if P (A | St−1)it−1 = 0.5
⎫
⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎭
(2.4)
This variable is then used to construct log odds from the raw data that show the probability
of the more expected state regardless of the color of the bingo ball, that is,
πit =
⎧
⎨
⎩
−eπit if Eit =Weπit if Eit = B or Eit = N
⎫
⎬
⎭ (2.5)
The Bayesian updater in this environment does not differentiate between confirming and dis-
confirming information, however, subjects may, prompting the construction of the following
dummy variables.
Cit =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1 if (Eit =W and st = B) or (Eit =W and st =W )
0 otherwise
⎫
⎬
⎭ (2.6)
Dit =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1 if (Eit = B and st =W ) or (Eit =W and st = B)
0 otherwise
⎫
⎬
⎭ (2.7)
That is, the above variables measure whether a signal received is viewed as confirmed or
disconfirmed from the point of view of a subject.
Next, confirmation bias may occur in more difficult cognitive decision making tasks. In
the experimental design, when subjects have seen equal numbers of black and white balls,
the Bayesian probability of 0.5 is very easy to calculate and equal numbers of black and
white signals occur only in disconfirming evidence cases10. Therefore, the Dit dummy is
differentiated to separate the “easy” disconfirming cases from other cases, as follows.
P ∗it = 1 if P (A | St) = 0.5, 0 otherwise (2.8)
D∗it = Dit × P ∗it (2.9)
10It is of relevance to note that, given the definitions of confirming and disconfirming pieces of evidence,
a piece of confirming evidence sends a probability report away from the prior, while a piece of disconfirming
evidence may send a probability report towards the prior. This holds for hypothetical Bayesians and subjects.
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Given the above variable definitions the following regression model is estimated and
tested for various types of updating behavior, as follows. Consider the following model for
each treatment,
πit = α0 + α1πit−1 + α2Cit + α3Dit + α4D∗it + α5[Cit × πit−1] + ξ1it (2.10)
where ξ1it is the idiosyncratic regression error and the data have been stacked across rounds11.
The hypothesis tests conducted on this model derive from the three possible updating be-
haviors that the design allows for: Bayesian updating, conservatism and confirmation bias
or a combination of the latter two heuristics. The null of Bayesian behavior is given by,
H10 : α0 + α2 = log
θ
1− θ ∩ α0 + α3 + α4 = − log
θ
1− θ ∩ α1 = 1 ∩ α5 = 0 (2.11)
Further, the null of no confirmation bias is given by,
H20 : 2α1 + α5 = 2 ∩ α0 + α2 = −(α0 + α3) (2.12)
Equivalently, the above hypothesis can be re-stated in inequalities and confirmation bias
would require that it be accepted.
The model and the related hypothesis tests presented so far can be explained graphically
which can assist in interpretation of the experimental data. The dummy variables Cit and
Dit can be constructed for both a hypothetical Bayesian and a subject. For a Bayesian,
the difference between the two sorts of information should be statistically insignificant in
explaining the log-odds ratios. Indeed, in (πit, πit−1) space, the regression lines are presented
in Figure 31 of Appendix C. The behavior of a Bayesian updater is represented by an intercept
of log
¡
θ
1−θ
¢
or− log
¡
θ
1−θ
¢
and a slope of one. In Figure 31, under conservatism, the regression
lines would lie beneath those of the hypothetical Bayesian but would be parallel. Under
confirmation bias the regression lines would not be parallel to those of a Bayesian nor would
they be parallel to one another if confirming evidence is treated differently from disconfirming
evidence. the hypothesis test presented above reflect these notions about the degree to which
estimated regression lines are parallel or not relative to those of a hypothetical Bayesian.
11Round-by-round regressions yielded qualitatively the same results, however, since there were relatively
few cases of Cit = 1 the significance of confirming evidence is clearer in the stacked regression.
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2.4.3 PATH DEPENDENCE AND CONFIRMATION BIAS
The above simple model assumes that all of the information history is contained in
the reported probability estimate. That is, subjects engage in only one-step updating such
that each probability report contains all the historically relevant information. However,
subjects may arrive at the same probability estimate with different information histories.
That is, there may be path-dependence in updating. A simple measure of path dependence
for information in this environment is to count how many pieces of confirming evidence a
subject has seen in a row, or, how many pieces of disconfirming evidence a subject has seen
in a row. Therefore consider the following variables constructed from the above definitions
of Cit and Dit.
C1it =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1 if Cit = 1 and Cit−1 = 0
0 otherwise
⎫
⎬
⎭ (2.13)
C2it =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1 if Cit = 1 and Cit−1 = 1 and Cit−2 = 0
0 otherwise
⎫
⎬
⎭ (2.14)
C3it =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1 if Cit = 1 and Cit−1 = 1 and Cit−2 = 1 and Cit−3 = 0
0 otherwise
⎫
⎬
⎭ (2.15)
CHit =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1 if Cit = 1 and C1it = 0 and C2it = 0 and C3it = 0
0 otherwise
⎫
⎬
⎭ (2.16)
The above definitions decompose the confirming cases (Cit) into whether a subject has seen
one, two, three or more such cases in a given round12. The definitions below provide the same
sequence for disconfirming cases. Together, the two sets of variables account for a number of
different paths that a subject can take in reporting probabilities with differentiation based
12The choice of three cases is a result of an analysis of the data that indicated very few higher level cases.
33
on confirming versus disconfirming evidence.
D1it =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1 if Dit = 1 and Dit−1 = 0
0 otherwise
⎫
⎬
⎭ (2.17)
D2it =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1 if Dit = 1 and Dit−1 = 1 and Dit−2 = 0
0 otherwise
⎫
⎬
⎭ (2.18)
D3it =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1 if Dit = 1 and Dit−1 = 1 and Dit−2 = 1 and Dit−3 = 0
0 otherwise
⎫
⎬
⎭ (2.19)
DHit =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1 if Dit = 1 and D1it = 0 and D2it = 0 and D3it = 0
0 otherwise
⎫
⎬
⎭ (2.20)
Next, in the pilot of the experimental procedure subjects reported a strong distaste
for any draw that resulted in an information path of equal numbers of black and white
balls, indicating that the odds were back to 0.5-0.5, as noted for the simpler model above.
Therefore, in those cases of disconfirming evidence which result in a history of equal numbers
of A and B draws the following variables can be constructed.
D∗kit = Dkit × P ∗it k = 1, 2, 3, H (2.21)
Given these additional variable definitions, the regression model is now given by,
πit =
⎧
⎨
⎩
β0 + β1πit−1 + β21C1it + β22C2it + β23C3it + β31D1it + β32D2it + β33D3it
+β41D∗1it + β42D
∗
2it + β43D
∗
3it + β5[Cit × πit−1] + ξ2it
⎫
⎬
⎭ (2.22)
with the associated hypothesis test of no confirmation bias,
H30 :
⎧
⎨
⎩
2β1 + β5 = 2 ∩ β0 + β21 = −(β0 + β31)∩
β0 + β22 = −(β0 + β32) ∩ β0 + β23 = −(β0 + β33)
⎫
⎬
⎭ (2.23)
so that rejection of H30 would imply the presence of confirmation bias even with varying
paths of information.
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2.4.4 DESCRIPTIVE TESTS
The above framework provides a regression approach for testing various updating behav-
iors. In addition to the above approach, tests on the means of the following variables can also
be conducted in order to provide inference on conservatism/overreaction and confirmation
bias. Consider variations of the log-odds updates defined as,
υit =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
πit − πit−1 − log θ1−θ if Cit = 1
πit−1 − πit − log θ1−θ if Dit = 1
πit − log θ1−θ if Cit = 0 ∩Dit = 0
⎫
⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎭
(2.24)
The variable therefore measures the step update for each subject in each round for each
treatment under confirming, disconfirming and neutral cases. Thus, in order to test for
conservatism the following hypothesis can be conducted,
H40 : mean(υit) = log
θ
1− θ (2.25)
Next, tests can be conducted to discern whether mean updates are different under con-
firming, disconfirming and neutral cases,
H50 : mean(υit | Cit = 1) = mean(υit | Dit = 1) (2.26)
H60 : mean(υit | Cit = 1) = mean(υit | Cit = 0 ∩Dit = 0) (2.27)
H70 : mean(υit | Dit = 1) = mean(υit | Cit = 0 ∩Dit = 0) (2.28)
These tests can be conducted on stacked data or for each subject in a treatment. In addition,
tests can be conducted in order to discern whether the mean of confirming updates differs
from disconfirming or neutral cases. These tests may also be conducted on stacked data or
for each subject and the next section presents a selection of such results.
In summary, in order to analyze the data resulting from the experiments the above frame-
work employs various steps. The first step is to convert the data into log-odds updates which
are constant given the theoretical likelihood of the design. Next, variables are constructed
that reflect whether, given a reported probability estimate, a subject has seen evidence in
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the form of signal that can be deemed as confirming or disconfirming a previously held belief.
These variables are then further decomposed depending on various paths of information that
could lead to a reported probability, that is, how many times has the subject seen confirming
or disconfirming evidence? Finally, the updates themselves are analyzed in a non-regression
framework. Thus, the framework provides a series of tests that can be constructed on stacked
round-by-round or individual data; the next section provides these results.
2.5 RESULTS
This section reports the results of the empirical analyses conducted on the data using the
analytical framework described above. The results are oriented around the three hypotheses
of relevance: Bayesian behavior, conservatism and confirmation bias.
• Are Subjects’ Bayesian?
As a description of the raw data, Figures 32-49 in Appendix C presents the average
reported probabilities (with one standard deviation bands) along with those of a hypothetical
Bayesian13. The plots clearly indicate that even though the hypothetical Bayesian often lies
within a one standard deviation band of the average, at any given draw in any given round
the average probability report is less than that of a Bayesian.
Next, Table 8 in Appendix B presents the estimation results of equation (2.10), the
simple model14. The model is estimated with fixed effects which are prevalent in all three
treatments. The coefficients are of the correct sign in all of the treatments although the
confirming slope coefficient, α5, estimates to be near zero in Treatment C. Table 8 also
presents the results of the Bayesian hypothesis test (H10) and the test of no confirmation
bias (H20). The data reject both hypotheses in all three treatments
15. Indeed Figures 50-52
13The great majority of subjects reported uniform priors at the start of each round with very few expec-
tions. Therefore the design was able to induce correct priors before the updating portion of the experiment
in each treatment.
14Note that in Tables 8-9 HF0 refers to the null of no fixed effects and hypothesis tests are presented as
(F,Prob > F ).
15Panel unit root tests indicated the rejection of a unit root in all treatments.
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in Appendix C present the estimated regression lines versus their Bayesian counterparts for
all three treatments. The fact that the data suggest non-Bayesian behavior in clearly seen
here.
• Are Subjects’ Conservative?
As in the case of the Bayesian hypothesis, Figures 50-52 in Appendix C provide a ca-
sual verification of conservative behavior. Further, the Wilcoxon tests reported in Table 10
suggest that the null of no conservatism as represented by H40 is rejected across treatments.
Overall, the data prefer non-Bayesian conservative behavior as witnessed by the estimated
regression lines which to a large extent lie within the bounds of Bayesian. Indeed, Figures
50-52 suggest that subjects are both conservative and possibly exhibit confirmation bias, the
hypothesis investigated next.
• Do Subjects’ Exhibit Confirmation Bias?
Table 8 in Appendix B presents the estimation results for the simple model, Table 9
presents the results for the model with decomposed confirming and disconfirming cases. The
nulls of no confirmation bias (H20 and H
3
0) are rejected in both models across treatments.
Further, Table 9 continues to accept the fixed effects assumption and the estimates are of the
correct sign across treatments. The regression lines in Figures 50-52 also suggest that subjects
treat confirming and disconfirming information differently. Indeed it is of importance to note
that the estimated regression lines are very similar in Treatments A and C relative to those
of Treatment B. This suggests that physical misperception of signals may be as important
as clear stimuli in generating confirmation bias. Indeed, it seems that the more difficult
proportion of θ = 0.6 of Treatment B leads to increased differentiation between confirming
and disconfirming evidence.
Next, Table 10 presents the test results for hypotheses H50 − H70 . In particular, across
treatments, the Mann-Whitney tests suggest that confirming updates are different from neu-
tral cases, as are the disconfirming updates. However, confirming updates are different from
non-confirming ones only in Treatment A. Table 11 in Appendix B reports the proportion of
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subjects for whom the mean update under confirming evidence is different from that under
disconfirming evidence at the 10% significance level, that is, the test results of H50 −H70 for
each subject. The results presented in Table 11 suggest that for roughly 20% of the subject
the mean of the updates under confirming evidence is different than that under disconfirming
evidence. Overall, the results suggest non-Bayesian behavior with strong evidence in favor
of conservatism with the presence of confirmation bias.
The main result, that subjects view confirming and disconfirming information differently,
can be viewed via a simple plot of the reported probabilities. Figures 53-55 in Appendix C
provide bubble plots of the reported estimates relative to the values that would be computed
by a hypothetical Bayesian for each treatment. The figures have been scaled so that the
bubbles can be clearly viewed as in some cases there is overlap. The size of the bubbles
reflects the number of subjects who were found to fall in the confirming, disconfirming and
neutral categories, a larger bubble represents a larger number of subjects. The plots clearly
indicate that around the 50% mark most subjects were neutral in their beliefs, however, as
the rounds progressed within a treatment, confirming cases began to emerge.
Finally, it is important to note that while confirmation bias exists in the experimental
environment considered here, it is not as strong a bias as when agents are involved in updating
with emotive stimuli. However, what may be of relevance here is that the bias does exist,
albeit to a smaller extent, in an environment which is often considered as a benchmark in
economic theory.
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2.6 CONCLUSION
In analyzing deviations from Bayesian updating, an important question is whether eco-
nomic agents exhibit cognitive biases. In this chapter one such bias, confirmation bias, is
investigated in a laboratory setting within the context of individuals reporting probability
estimates. These probability estimates are solicited having induced risk-neutral behavior
with truthful revelation through a payoff mechanism that rewards probability reports that
are close to those of a hypothetical Bayesian.
The experimental data displays non-Bayesian behavior and provides evidence of the
conservatism heuristic with the presence of confirmation bias. The literature has documented
the presence of this bias with emotive stimuli instead of the non-emotive stimuli employed
here. The literature has also documented the bias within the context of a decision-making
task. However, the literature has not documented the presence of the bias when stimuli are
non-emotive and subjects must only report probability estimates as opposed to engaging in
a full decision task. This chapter provides an experimental environment, analytical method
and empirical evidence suggesting the presence of confirmation bias even when stimuli are
non-emotive and agents report probability estimates. Future research may evaluate the
presence of this bias in strategic market settings in order to bolster the evidence provided in
this chapter.
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3.0 IS HIGH CAPACITY UTILIZATION NO LONGER INFLATIONARY
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Industrial capacity utilization measures are viewed by monetary authorities as useful infla-
tionary indicators. As a resource utilization measure, capacity utilization is defined as the
ratio of actual to capacity output, where the latter quantity is typically estimated with one
of several available filtering techniques. In Canada the aggregate capacity utilization series
is benchmarked to survey data, providing a unique opportunity to examine aggregate data
that reflect actual business conditions1. However, recently for Canada, capacity utilization
levels have been high without inducing increases in inflation. Figure 56 in Appendix C pro-
vides a plot of capacity utilization and core inflation. The plot suggests that through time
the relationship between capacity utilization and inflation may have diminished in terms
of levels and/or co-movements. Further, in recent years, the series has breached the well
accepted level of the non-accelerating inflationary rate of capacity utilization (NAICU) of
82% without corresponding increases in inflation.
These observations prompt two natural questions: is high capacity utilization no longer
inflationary, and if not, why? This chapter addresses these questions by first establishing
1See Fixed Capital Flows and Stocks (Statistics Canada) for details on the construction of aggregate
capacity utilization series using survey responses. The relevant survey is the Capital Expenditures Survey
that requests firms to answer the following question. “For the year [t], this plant operated at what percentage
of its capacity?”, [where], “Capacity is defined as maximum production attainable under normal conditions.
With regard to normal conditions, please follow the company’s operating practices with respect to the use of
productive facilities, overtime, workshifts, holidays, etc. When any of your facilities permit the substitution
of one product for another, use a product mix at capacity which is most similar to the composition of your
[year t] output.”
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relevant stylized facts drawn from empirical models of capacity utilization-inflation Phillips
curves. The estimation results indicate that the effect of capacity utilization on inflation has
diminished over time, and that there are statistically significant breaks in the relationship.
These breaks correspond to economic events that can be interpreted as having increased
the degree of competitiveness and, to a lesser extent, decreased the level of nominal rigidi-
ties in the Canadian economy. In order to qualitatively lend credence to this conjecture,
this chapter estimates the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of Ireland (2003).
The model incorporates monopolistically competitive firms who face time-varying cost-push
shocks and Rotemberg (1982) style nominal menu costs of adjusting prices. As a result
the model delivers a capacity utilization-inflation trade-off that is in part a function of the
degree of competitiveness and nominal rigidities present in the economy. The empirical
exercise demonstrates that the estimated aggregate price mark-up may have decreased, as
may have the degree of nominal rigidity in the Canadian economy, lending credence to the
conjectures behind the observed breaks in the capacity utilization-inflation relationship. The
main conclusion is that the economy may be tending towards characterizations provided by
competitive equilibrium flexible price models which do not necessarily predict a structural
relation between inflation and real resource utilization measures.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. In Section 3.2, empirical models of
the capacity utilization-inflation Phillips curve are specified under the assumption that in-
flation expectations are backward looking and under the assumption that these expectations
may also be forward looking, given that the Bank of Canada instituted an inflation target-
ing regime in the early 1990’s. The specifications take the form of time-varying parameter
models (as per Kim & Nelson (1999)), single structural break models (as per Hansen (2000))
and multiple structural break models (as per Bai & Perron (1998)). Further, the timing of
the breaks are estimated using the likelihood based procedures as per DeJong et al (2004).
Estimation results, presented in Section 3.3, indicate that there is a steady deterioration in
the capacity utilization-inflation relationship through time.
The central conjecture in this chapter on the reasons driving the stylized facts, is that
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the Canadian economy has become more competitive and, to a lesser extent, faces reduced
nominal rigidities. An explanation of a leading positive relationship between capacity utiliza-
tion and inflation is as follows. If firms are monopolistic competitors then when faced with,
say, a positive demand shock, they will ratchet up production relative to a fixed capacity.
Increased production will drive up costs, which will be passed on to consumers through the
price-setting power of firms resulting in an increase in inflation. This increase in inflation
would be associated with high capacity utilization as a result of the increase in production
relative to capacity. However, if firms are competitive then they will be unable to pass on
cost increases, reducing the effect on inflation2. In Section 3.4 of this chapter a micro-founded
New Keynesian model by Ireland (2003) is described that captures this intuition. In Section
3.5, the model is estimated to demonstrate that the aggregate price mark-up has decreased,
and that the degree to which nominal rigidities are present may have decreased. As a result,
the statistical findings of Section 3.3 are explored formally and the chapter concludes in
Section 3.6 with a summary of the stylized facts drawn and the explanations given for them.
The conclusions put forth in this chapter do not contradict related recent findings. In-
deed, Paquet & Robidoux (2001) find that, in decomposing the Solow residual, an assumption
that the Canadian economy is described by perfect competition and constant returns to scale
best fits the data. In addition, Paquet & Robidoux (2001) find that when capital stocks are
adjusted for capital utilization rates in Canada, productivity shocks are exogenous to real
and monetary forces. The analysis in this chapter is complementary to these findings. Thus
the main contribution of this chapter is to first develop stylized facts for a variable that
clearly reflects business conditions due to its’ measurement methodology and then attempt
to explain the facts in a simple well-known framework.
Finally, the analysis in this chapter also acts as an application of an emerging synthesis
between New Keynesian and ‘real’ business cycle models. Indeed Clarida et al. (2000)
and Ireland (2002, 2003) among others attempt to marry the advantages afforded by real
2See Shapiro (1989) for details on the two transmission mechanisms and an early introduction to the
issue of capacity utilization-inflation dynamics for the United States. Finn (1996) demonstrates that a
competitive equilibrium model with a role for energy shocks adequately explains the capacity utilization-
inflation relationship for the United States.
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business cycle transmissions of technology and preference shocks with non-Walrasian shocks,
such as the cost-push shocks considered here in analyzing the capacity utilization-inflation
relationship. This synthesis is emerging as fertile ground, with strong micro-foundations3,
to sort out the competing sources of business cycle fluctuations. This chapter adds to the
synthesis by analyzing a relationship between inflation and a macroeconomic variable that
results from a comprehensive survey of firms.
3.2 EMPIRICAL MODELS
In order to determine whether there has been a break over time in the statistical rela-
tionship between capacity utilization and inflation, continuous and discrete break tests must
be robust across assumptions on inflation expectations. Within the time period considered
in this section, 1975QI-2002QIV, the Bank of Canada implemented two main changes in
monetary policy. First, in the 1980’s the Bank of Canada decelerated in order to reduce the
high and variable inflation Canada had experienced in previous decades. Second, the Bank of
Canada instituted an inflation targeting regime in 1991QI and since then has moved towards
a regime of almost complete transparency of monetary policy. Therefore two types of mod-
els are specified: a backward looking model and a mixture model that combines backward
looking and forward looking inflation expectations.
3.2.1 BACKWARD LOOKING EXPECTATIONS
Consider the standard predictive capacity utilization-inflation Phillips Curve4,
πt = α0 + α1ut−1 + π
e
t (3.1)
3Here micro-foundations refer to the fact that New Keynesian models now specify IS and Phillips curves
based on explicit optimization given assumptions, versus ad-hoc specifications of these relations.
4See Emery & Chang (1997) and references therein for a background on utilization-inflation Phillips
curves that have been estimated in the literature.
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where πt represents inflation, ut represents capacity utilization and πet represents expected
inflation. The backward looking expectations assumption specifies inflation expectations as
a lag over past inflation, with the lag coefficients summing to unity. A lag specification often
employed for Canada (see Johnson (2002), Longworth (2002) and references therein) yields,
πt = α0 + α1ut−1 + α2πt−1 + α3πt−2, α2 + α3 = 1 (3.2)
The unconstrained equation (3.2) yields the following backward looking expectations empir-
ical specification,
πt = α0 + α1ut−1 + α2πt−1 + α3πt−2 + α4xt−1 + ε1t (3.3)
where xt−1 is the change in the Canada-U.S. real exchange rate that is included to account
for the small and open nature of the Canadian economy.
3.2.2 MIXTURE EXPECTATIONS
Under the assumption of mixture expectations there is weight on forward looking ex-
pectations, thus the analog of (3.2) is given by,
πt = α0 + α1ut−1 + α2πt−1 + α3πt−2 + α5πet , α5 = 1− α2 − α3 (3.4)
where πet represents period t’s expectation of inflation for period t+1 and is a measured vari-
able5. The unconstrained version of (3.4) yields the following mixture expectations empirical
specification,
πt = α0 + α1ut−1 + α2πt−1 + α3πt−2 + α4xt−1 + α5πet + ε2t (3.5)
5Data were obtained from the Conference Board of Canada’s survey of forecasters to proxy for inflation
expectations. As this time series begins in 1975QI, the analysis was conducted for the sample period 1975QI-
2002QIV. Alternate series for inflation expectations, constructed from actual inflation rates, does allow for
a longer time dimension, however, yields the same qualitative results. The main advantage of the survey
series is that it allows the model to incorporate actual expectations. The remaining data on core inflation
(i.e. inflation less the influence of indirect taxes, energy and other volatile components), capacity utilization
and exhange rates were obtained from the Department of Finance Canada. The data collected were as close
an approximation to a real-time dataset as possible.
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which can be interpreted as nesting the backward looking model. Indeed the models are
specified without restricting them to their respective inflation expectations assumptions.
The models are estimated in this unrestricted form as it is assumed that no one assumption
on expectations can reflect reality. Further, by estimating unrestricted versions it can be
seen to what extent forward looking expectations matter by verifying whether the estimate
of α5 is significant and positive.
In order to determine whether the relationship has deteriorated under backward looking
or mixture expectations, the above two models are estimated with discrete break techniques
as well as a time-varying parameter approach; the latter would account for a continuously
deteriorating relationship. There are several techniques that can be employed in evaluating
whether a regression suffers from breaks in its’ parameters across time. The focus in the
present analysis is on endogenously estimating any breaks (as opposed to, say, inferring
breaks using rolling Chow tests), and evaluating whether the relationships in (3.3) and (3.5)
are deteriorating over time. Therefore, the next section details the estimation methods
employed.
3.2.3 ESTIMATION METHODS
The time-varying parameter models are estimated using the Kalman Filter as discussed
in Kim & Nelson (1999). In particular, given the following general regression model,
yt = xtβ + εt (3.6)
where x is a matrix of regressors (possibly containing lagged values of y) and β is a vector
of coefficients, Kim & Nelson (1999) discuss a time-varying parameter version of (3.6) given
by,
yt = xtβt + et
βt = βt−1 + υt (3.7)
et ∼ NID(0, σ2e), υt ∼ NID(0, Q)
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The inferential focus is on the estimates of the standard deviation of each of the time-varying
parameters (where Q is the diagonal variance-covariance matrix), the resulting time varying
estimates (bβt), and the model’s conditional variances and forecast errors which identify peri-
ods of volatility. The backward looking and mixture models presented above are estimated
using this general framework.
Time-varying parameter estimation evaluates any continuous breaks, inference can be
strengthened with discrete breaks tests. If there are any shifts then structural break models
can be used to date them. For this purpose, the methods of Hansen (2000) and Bai & Perron
(1998) are employed to identify structural breaks. The inferential focus in Hansen (2000)
is on identifying one possible break over time in a model such as that in (3.6), whereas the
inferential focus in Bai & Perron (1998) is on the following four types of break tests. The
first is a test of zero versus a specific number of breaks (say, k), denoted the supF (0|k)
tests. The second type, denoted the Dmax tests are tests of no breaks versus an unknown
number of breaks. The third type of tests are for the null of k breaks versus k + 1 breaks
in the model. The fourth type, which are most useful in the present context, are those that
estimate any breaks sequentially. The next section presents the estimation results using
these methodologies for identifying discrete and continuous breaks.
The breaks identified by the discrete-break tests outlined above can be further evaluated
by employing the timing methodology of DeJong et al (2004). This method employs the
maximum likelihood estimates of models, such as those above, over varying intervals of time
to compute the probability of a break in any given time period. In particular, given a sample
[1, T ] and two possible sub-samples, say, [1, T1] and [T2+1, T ], DeJong et al (2004) maintain
the assumption that there is a break in the intervening sample [T1, T2]. The idea then is to
use likelihoods to assign probabilities of a break to particular dates in [T1, T2], as follows.
First, two likelihoods are estimated (initial and final) for [1, T1] and [T2 + 1, T ] respectively.
Then, given the fixed estimates for these two sub-samples, the procedure requires that as
the sample is increased, the likelihoods be estimated again leaving free the parameters over
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which a break is suspected6. Letting L1(· | θ1) and L1(· | θ2) denote the initial and final
likelihoods (where θ is the vector of parameters in a model Mt) and j0 as the true unknown
break-date, the conditional likelihood given the occurrence of a break at date j is,
L({Mt} | j0 = j, θ1, θ2) = L1({Mt}jt=1 | θ1)× L2({Mt}Tt=j+1 | θ2) (3.8)
Given this conditional likelihood, conditional probabilities can be constructed as,
p(j0 = j | {Mt} , θ1, θ2) = L({Mt} | j0 = j, θ1, θ2)T2X
τ=T1+1
L({Mt} | j0 = τ, θ1, θ2)
(3.9)
and hence the probabilities assigned to any given break date in an interval can be computed.
These probabilities, that are conditional on there being a break, can thus identify the tim-
ing of breaks with confidence intervals derived from the cumulative distribution function
associated with the probabilities above.
3.3 ESTIMATION RESULTS
Table 12 in Appendix B presents the results of estimating equations (3.3) and (3.5)
using Hansen’s (2000) methods assuming a single break. For the backward looking model
the estimated break date (1982QIV) has relatively narrow 95% confidence interval (1982QII-
1983QI) and a good fit (as the joint R2 of the model with one break at 1982QIV is 0.819).
However, in these results, the pre-break estimate of α1 is rather weak and the post-break
estimate is more significant; this could be a feature of the short pre-break sample. The
estimates for the mixture model are stronger in that the estimate for α5 is significant in
the overall and pre-break sample. In the post-break sample the significance of α5’s estimate
falls reflecting in part the low variability of inflation expectations in that time period as
6The results presented in this paper are the one-shot probabilities for parametric models as per DeJong
et al (2004). Estimation is carried out with the free parameter being the effect of capacity utilization on
inflation (α1); T1 and T2 are chosen so that the initial and final likelihoods are based on at least thirty
observations.
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exhibited in Figure 57 of Appendix C. The main estimation result for the mixture model
is the break date of 1983QIV with a large confidence interval of 1982QII-1991QII which is
suggestive of multiple breaks. Finally, Table 12 confirms a decreasing estimate of α1 from
0.223 (pre-break) to 0.095 (post-break) with the former being the more significant estimate
in the mixture model. Overall, the results presented in Table 1 suggest breaks in both the
backward looking and mixture models with possibly a decreasing coefficient on capacity
utilization across the breaks.
Multiple break tests following Bai & Perron (1998) are presented in Table 13 of Appendix
B. The supF (0|k) tests reject the null of breaks for the alternative of k possible breaks across
the board (k = 1 to 5) for both the backward looking and mixture models. The same holds for
the Dmax tests of no breaks versus the null of an unknown number of breaks. The supF (k+
1|k) tests of the null of k breaks versus the alternate of k + 1 breaks suggest two breaks for
the backward looking model and three for the mixture model. The estimation of sequential
breaks finds two breaks for the backward looking model that correspond to the 1981-1982
recession and the inflation targeting regime officially instituted by the Bank of Canada in
1991QI. For the mixture model three breaks are estimated sequentially corresponding to
the 1981-1982 recession, a period of time corresponding to increasing free trade and fiscal
stability (1996QI-1997QII) and inflation targeting. In Canada, after the (possibly deflation
induced) 1981-1982 recession, budget surpluses were reported from 1995 onwards and aside
from monetary policy regime changes, the free trade process culminated in the signing of
NAFTA in the late 1990’s. Overall, the results suggest multiple discrete breaks in the linear
relations (3.3) and (3.5) and attention can now be turned towards identifying any continuous
breaks.
Table 14 in Appendix B along with Figures 4-6 in Appendix C provide the results of
time-varying parameter estimation following Kim & Nelson (1999). In the estimation diffuse
priors were assumed for the initial values and a time-varying approach was validated by the
Breusch-Pagan LM tests reported in Table 147. Figure 59 plots the time-varying parameter
7Whereas the LM test clearly supports a time-varying approach for the backward looking model, the test
for the mixture model is marginally supportive.
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bα1t for both models and clearly demonstrates the decreasing effect of capacity utilization on
inflation. Further, Figures 60 and 61 suggest that the introduction of survey expectations re-
duces the variance of the specification while leaving the forecast errors relatively unaffected8.
It is of importance to note that alternate priors for the initial values lead to qualitatively
similar results, namely a decreasing bα1t for both models albeit with different standard error
estimates for the time-varying parameters. However, Kim & Nelson (1999) note that when βt
evolves as specified in (3.7), the initial values in the Kalman Filter can be set to an arbitrary
value with large initial uncertainty, hence the diffuse prior results are reported in Table 14
and in Figures 59-61.
Finally, Figures 62-63 present the one-shot probabilities computed using the DeJong et
al (2004) methodology. Figure 62 presents the results from estimating both the backward
looking model and the mixture model assuming that the errors in equations (3.3) and (3.5)
are not autocorrelated; the results in Figure 63 allow for autocorrelation. As can be seen in
the plots, the highest probabilities of breaks are assigned in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s.
Overall the results suggest discrete breaks along with a continuous deterioration in the
utilization-inflation relationship. In addition the data prefer a model that incorporates for-
ward looking behavior. Finally, the results can be interpreted within the context of recent
Canadian economic history. This history can be summarized by three main economic events:
deflation and inflation targeting, fiscal stability and the process of free trade. After the ex-
cesses of the 1970’s, the Bank of Canada was committed to a transparent monetary policy
that ensured low and stable inflation. This commitment resulted in the initial deflation of the
1980’s and the subsequent move to inflation targeting. Indeed, Longworth (2002) outlines
the resulting benefits stemming from reduced inflation uncertainty.
“The reduced uncertainty about inflation seems to have had a number of significant
benefits. First, it seems to have led to a decline in relative wage variability because of
less disagreement about the inflation outlook, therefore leading to a better allocation of
labour. Second, it certainly has made planning easier and has led to longer labour and
financial contracts, which means lower transactions and bargaining costs for firms and
households. Third, it has likely been an important factor in a reduction of days lost to
8In addition, given the results in Table 14, the null hypothesis that survey expectations are not significant
can be rejected with a likelihood ratio test.
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labour disruptions. Fourth, it means that there is less need to protect oneself against
unexpected inflation, which is a real saving of resources. Fifth, it has been a factor leading
to the development of more complete financial markets (with longer-term instruments),
which allows a greater diversification of risks at lower cost. Finally, it has been associated
with less variable interest rates, which, in turn, have led to lower capital losses and gains
on bonds, and have tended to lead to lower risk premiums on longer-term instruments.”
These benefits can be clearly interpreted as having decreased the degree of nominal
rigidity. In addition, fiscal stability can lead to a better allocation of resources due to
reduced uncertainty about aggregate fiscal policies. Such stability was obtained by a move
to eliminate high deficits, surpluses were indeed finally reported in the mid-1990’s. This
result was accomplished with a mixture of reduced taxes and cuts in spending.
Finally, the process of free trade should decrease the significance of cost-push shocks as
firms compete to satisfy aggregate demand. For Canada, free trade not only opened the vast
markets of the United States but also led to increased competitive pressures from firms in the
United States. It would therefore seem that a reasonable conjecture is that these increased
competitive pressures and decreased rigidities should lead to an uncoupling between a real
resource utilization measure and inflation.
In order to verify this conjecture, a model is required that predicts a relationship between
capacity utilization and inflation due in part to nominal rigidities and cost-push pressures.
That is, the model must capture the intuition outlined in the Introduction (as adapted
from Shapiro (1989)). Given such an environment, empirical evaluation of the model must
show that an uncoupling between real resource utilization and inflation may occur if the
significance of cost-push shocks decreases relative to ‘fundamental’ shocks such as technology
and demand shocks. Such an environment is provided within the New Keynesian literature
that allows for cost-push shocks to compete with ‘fundamental’ shocks in the data; in addition
the literature is able to account for both backward looking and forward looking behavior.
The next section describes one such model and evaluates it empirically to lend credence to
the above conjecture.
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3.4 MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION AND CAPACITY UTILIZATION
The previous section documented that free trade, fiscal stability and changes in mone-
tary policy regimes may have had an effect on the capacity utilization-inflation relationship.
In particular these institutional changes can be interpreted as mapping into increased com-
petition and decreased rigidities in the economy. This section outlines a model of imperfect
competition with sticky prices, and then estimates the model in order to possibly lend cre-
dence to this conjecture. The model is provided by Ireland (2003) and is indeed a standard
in the literature.
3.4.1 THE BASIC ENVIRONMENT
The aggregate economy, operating in discrete time, is assumed to consist of a repre-
sentative household, a finished goods firm, a continuum of intermediate inputs firms and a
central bank. The intermediate inputs firms each produce a differentiated output used in
the production of the final good. The details of the basic environment are as follows.
3.4.1.1 HOUSEHOLDS Households are assumed to maximize utility defined over
consumption, money and the disutility of labor. The representative household’s optimization
objective is given by,
Max. U = E0
∞X
0
βt
½
at logCt + log
Mt
Pt
− N
η
t
η
¾
(3.10)
s.t. PtCt +
Bt
Rt
+Mt =Mt−1 +Bt−1 + Tt +WtNt +Dt (3.11)
β ∈ (0, 1), η ≥ 1 (3.12)
In the specification of the budget constraint (3.11) above, it is assumed that the household
holds bonds (B) and money (M), where the former matures at a gross nominal rate of
Rt between two discrete time periods. The household also receives transfers (T ) from the
monetary authority and works (N) in order to earn wages (W ) to meet its’ expenditures.
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Finally, the household is assumed to own the intermediate inputs firms and thus receives a
dividend payment from the firms in each period (D). The solution to the households problem
yields a demand for money balances, supply of labor and a demand for the final consumption
good, as follows,
Mt
Pt
=
CtRt
at(Rt − 1)
(3.13)
CtN
η−1
t =
atWt
Pt
(3.14)
βEt
½
at+1
Pt+1Ct+1
¾
=
at
PtCtRt
(3.15)
These first order conditions along with the budget constraint are the first in a system of
equations that will characterize the aggregate economy.
3.4.1.2 FIRMS There are two types of firms, one that produces a final consumption
good and a continuum of intermediate inputs firms that supply inputs to the final consump-
tion good firm. The final good firm is assumed to operate in a competitive environment and
thus solves the following static problem,
Max. ΠFt = PtYt −
1Z
0
PitYitdi (3.16)
s.t. Yt =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1Z
0
Y
θt−1
θt
it di
⎫
⎬
⎭
θt
θt−1
(3.17)
where (3.17) is the production function for the final good firm. The solution to the final good
firms’ problem yields the standard demand for intermediate inputs and the price aggregator,
Yit = Yt
½
Pit
Pt
¾−θt
(3.18)
Pt =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1Z
0
P 1−θtit di
⎫
⎬
⎭
1
1−θt
(3.19)
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The intermediate firms are assumed to be monopolistically competitive and since each is
assumed to produce a distinct perishable good such that firm i produces good i, the analysis
focuses on one such representative firm. This type of firm is assumed to be owned by the
household and thus it maximizes the real value of the dividend to the household. Further,
as is typically the case, it is the specification of this particular portion of the environment
that generates Phillips curves. Assuming that these firms face a quadratic adjustment cost
of changing prices suffices9, and thus the intermediate firm’s optimization problem is,
Max. ΠIit = E0
∞X
0
βt
at
Ct
½
PitYit −WtNt
Pt
− c(Pit, Pit−1)
¾
(3.20)
s.t. Yit = ZtNit (3.21)
Yit = Yt
½
Pit
Pt
¾−θt
(3.22)
c(Pit, Pit−1) =
φ
2
∙
Pit
πPit−1
− 1
¸2
Yt, φ > 0 (3.23)
The solution to the intermediate firms’ problem yields,
0 =
θt
1− θt
µ
Pit
Pt
¶ 1
θt−1 Ytat
PtCt
+
at
1− θt
µ
Pit
Pt
¶ θt
θt−1 Wt
Pt
Yt
Zt
1
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(3.24)
− φ
∙
Pit
πPit−1
− 1
¸
Ytat
πPit−1Ct
+ βφEt
µ
at+1
at
µ
Pit
πPit−1
− 1
¶
YtPit+1
πPitPit
¶
as the first order condition in which price dynamics are induced by the assumed degree of
nominal rigidity (φ).
9Alternatives to ‘sticky-prices are available, for instance, the assumption of Calvo contracts. Since the
objective is to write down an empirical model, the assumption of Rotemberg (1982) style costs of nominal
adjustment suffice.
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3.4.1.3 STOCHASTIC ASSUMPTIONS AND EQUILIBRIUMCONDITIONS
There are three types of shocks in this economy, namely, demand shocks, technology shocks
and cost-push shocks. Demand shocks (at), technology shocks (Zt) and cost-push shocks (θt)
are assumed to all have steady state values a, z and θ that are larger than unity. All shocks
are assumed to evolve as per the following logarithmic processes.
log(at) = (1− ρa) log(a) + ρa log(at−1) + εat, a > 1 (3.25)
log(Zt) = log(z) + log(Zt−1) + εzt, z > 1 (3.26)
log(θt) = (1− ρθ) log(θ) + ρθ log(θt−1) + εθt, θ > 1 (3.27)
Equilibrium in this model is characterized by symmetry,
Yit = Yt, Nit = Nt, Pit = Pt, Dit = Dt (3.28)
Money and bond markets clear so that,
Mt =Mt−1 + Tt (3.29)
Bt = Bt−1 = 0 (3.30)
The only remaining required features of the model are a Taylor rule, to represent the
activities of the central bank, and a specification for capacity utilization.
54
3.4.2 CAPACITY UTILIZATION
Capacity utilization is typically defined to be the ratio of actual to capacity output (Y t,
see Shapiro(1989)). Here capacity output is defined to be the efficient level of output, which
is equivalent to claiming that it would be the level of output chosen by a benevolent social
planner who would solve,
Max. U = E0
∞X
0
βt
⎧
⎨
⎩at log Y t −
1
η
⎛
⎝
1Z
0
Nitdi
⎞
⎠
η⎫⎬
⎭ (3.31)
s.t. Y t = Zt
⎛
⎝
1Z
0
N
θt−1
θt
it di
⎞
⎠
θt
θt−1
(3.32)
The solution to the problem yields an expression for capacity output implying that another
equation can be added to the system so far, namely the specification of capacity utilization,
Ut =
Yt
a
1
η
t Zt
(3.33)
The definition of capacity utilization here is very similar to the definition of an output gap,
indeed the two are the same in this environment. In order to ensure that this is a reasonable
specification, Figure 58 in Appendix C plots the two series and as can be seen in the figure,
there is very little difference between the ratio (Ut) and the difference (the output gap)10
measures.
10The output gap series was obtained from the Bank of Canada for the time period 1975QI-2002QIV.
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3.4.3 THE EQUILIBRIUM SYSTEM
The equilibrium system consists of the first order conditions of the household, its’ budget
constraint, the aggregate production function having imposed symmetry, the aggregate real
dividends from the intermediate input firms to the households and the first order condition
of the intermediate inputs firms. The system can be normalized by Zt and wages, money,
labor, dividends and capacity output can be eliminated. The steady states of those variables
not specified exogenously are given by,
R =
zπ
β
, C = Y =
µ
a
θ − 1
θ
¶ 1
η
, U =
µ
θ − 1
θ
¶ 1
η
(3.34)
Employing these steady states in log-linearizing the system yields the following form,
at = ρaat−1 + εat, εat ∼ NID(0, σ2a), |ρa| < 1 (3.35)
ut = yt − ωat, ω = η−1 (3.36)
ut = αxut−1 + (1− αx)Etut+1 − (rt −Etπt+1) + (1− ω) (1− ρa)at, αx ∈ [0, 1] (3.37)
θt = ρθθt−1 + εθt, εθt ∼ NID(0, σ2θ), |ρθ| < 1 (3.38)
πt = βαππt−1 + β(1− απ)Etπt+1 +
η(θ − 1)
φ
ut −
1
φ
θt, απ ∈ [0, 1] (3.39)
gt = yt − yt−1 + zt → g = z (3.40)
zt = εzt, εzt ∼ NID(0, σ2z) (3.41)
rt = ρrrt−1 + ρππt + ρggt + ρuut + εrt, εrt ∼ NID(0, σ2r) (3.42)
where all variables are in log deviations from their steady states, that is, xt = log(Xt) −
log(X) where X is the steady state value of the variable Xt. Equations (3.35), (3.38) and
(3.41) describe the shock processes for demand, cost-push and technology shocks respectively.
Equation (3.37) is the familiar IS curve, and equation (3.39) is the forward looking Phillips
curve. Finally, equation (3.42) is the Taylor rule followed by the central bank. Here it is
assumed that the Bank of Canada reacts to inflation, the observable growth rate of output
(gt) and capacity utilization. In addition, the above model can be simplified by letting the
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cost-push shock be defined as et = 1φθt implying that ρe = ρθ and σe =
1
φσθ. Finally, setting
αx = απ = 0 yields the original micro-foundations, since lagged inflation terms typically
have an influence, these additional parameters have been introduced.
The main conjecture in this chapter is that the aggregate Canadian economy has become
increasingly competitive after 1984QII, and that the economy may also be facing reduced
nominal rigidities after that break as well11. Within the context of the model above, demon-
strating the validity of this conjecture translates into demonstrating that the steady state
price mark-up
¡
1
θ−1
¢
and φ have decreased conditional upon any changes in the curvature of
the disutility of labor function as measured by η; given that the influence of utilization on
inflation is given by ψ = η(θ−1)φ in the Phillips curve. Thus, maximum likelihood methods
are employed in the next section to estimate the parameters.
Finally, it is instructive to note that the definition of capacity utilization above is different
from that typically assumed in the literature. The analysis of capacity utilization as a
propagation tool has received attention from several researchers. Wen (1998) builds a real
business cycle model with a depreciation-in-use definition of capacity utilization in order to
demonstrate that the resulting propagation mechanism is sufficient to explain several aspects
of the U.S. business cycle. Unlike Wen (1998), in this chapter capacity utilization is defined
as the ratio of choices under decentralized and social planner problems, with the result that
capacity utilization moves in response to technology and demand shocks. The depreciation-
in-use assumption is also evaluated by Fagnart et al. (1999) in a model with imperfect
markets. They focus on the difference between capacity utilization and capital utilization.
In their economy monopolistic firms use putty-clay technologies and react to demand shocks.
As a result they are able to demonstrate that some firms may idle and why utilization rates
may differ across firms. The analysis in this chapter can therefore be interpreted as being
complementary to those of Wen (1998) and Fagnart et al. (1999). The main difference
being that here an explicit characterization with respect to market structure is being sought
as the conjecture is that increased competition, all things equal, will lead this variable to
11This date corresponds to the endpoint of the 95% confidence interval of the first break in the mixture
model noted in Table 13.
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potentially lose its’ link with inflation. Indeed Corrado & Mattey (1997) discuss the link
between capacity utilization and inflation for the United States in detail. They outline
the explanations behind the link between high capacity utilization and inflation, and also
provide a discussion of the practicalities of the measurement of this statistic for the United
States. However, in Canada, the transmission of high capacity utilization to inflation may
be breaking down, using aggregate data benchmarked to surveys which provides a unique
inflationary indicator.
3.5 MODEL EVALUATION
The model in the previous section could conceivably be simulated given calibrated values
for parameters. However, assuming values for the parameters of the Taylor rule can be a
questionable proposition. This is in part due to the instability of the Taylor rule in general,
and in the Canadian context there does not seem to be a consensus on its’ parametrization.
Therefore, parameter estimates are obtained from the data.
3.5.1 ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION
The above model can be written as the following system of linear stochastic difference
equations.
ξt ≡ [yt−1 rt−1 πt−1 gt−1 ut−1 πt ut]0 (3.43)
υt ≡ [at et zt εrt]0 (3.44)
AEtξt+1 = Bξt + Cυt (3.45)
where the matrices A,B and C have as elements the parameters as they appear in the system
(3.35)-(3.42). Given this structural form a method is needed to solve the system of linear
stochastic difference equations in terms of the parameters; the solved system could then be
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used to calibrate or estimate the parameters. This particular structural form can be solved
using a Schur decomposition; the solved structural system is,
ζt ≡ [yt−1 rt−1 πt−1 gt−1 ut−1 at et zt εrt]0 (3.46)
εt ≡ [εat εet εzt εrt]0 (3.47)
ζt+1 = Π(Λ)ζt +∆εt+1, ∆ =
∙
0
(5×4)
, I
(4×4)
¸0
(3.48)
where Π is a matrix containing the parameters of the model and comes from combinations
of the matrices A,B and C. Finally, the vector Λ represents the deep parameters of interest.
In the system represented by (3.48), certain variables are unobserved and others are
observed. In particular it is not possible to observe an underlying cost-push shock process
and thus filtering methods are required in order to form statistical inference on parameters
which is the goal of the exercise. For this purpose Kalman Filtering is employed widely in
the literature and is used in the present analysis. The Kalman Filter requires a state-space
representation that links observables to unobservables. The observables (per capita output
growth, inflation and real interest rates) are denoted as12,
γt ≡ [gt πt rt]0 (3.49)
The state-space representation of the model is therefore,
ζt+1 = Π(Λ)ζt +∆εt+1 (3.50)
γt = Γ(Λ)ζt (3.51)
Σ = E(εtε0t) = diag(σ
2
a, σ
2
e , σ
2
z , σ
2
r) (3.52)
Γ(Λ) = [Π(Λ)4 Π(Λ)3 Π(Λ)2]
0 (3.53)
which yields a log-likelihood function logL(Λ), the subscripts 4, 3 and 2 denote the corre-
sponding rows of Π, the reduced form matrix. However, the model is difficult to identify
partly because σe = 1φσθ enters the variance-covariance matrix of the state system. Indeed, it
12Data were obtained from Cansim on real GDP (series v1992067), the implicit price deflator (series
v1997756), population (series v1) and the 3-month Canadian Treasury bill rate (series v122531).
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is well-known that such estimation may be plagued by identification problems (see Hamilton
(1994)). Therefore, the next section presents estimates for various versions of the model in
order to evaluate the conjectures13.
3.5.2 ESTIMATION RESULTS
In the model described above a link between utilization and inflation exists in so far as
the cost-push shock process is in operation and the degree of nominal rigidities is significant.
Indeed, the New Keynesian literature estimates the above model assuming a steady state
mark-up of 20% (θ = 6) and a level of rigidity given by φ = 50, which corresponds to
goods prices being reset a little more than once per year. However, given the estimation
results of the backward looking and mixture models, the main conjecture is that the relative
importance of cost-push shocks and the degree of rigidity is diminishing, thus causing an
uncoupling of inflation from capacity utilization. Therefore, the inferential focus in this
section is on the estimates of ρθ (ρe), σθ (σe) and φ, in one form or another. In addition,
given the identification issue discussed above, several versions of the model were estimated
in order to ascertain whether the conjectures holds, albeit if qualitatively.
Table 15 in Appendix B presents the baseline estimation results having fixed the values
of θ and φ to conventional levels14. The results suggest a large estimate of η across the
three time periods (full sample, pre-break and post-break). This is due to a low estimated ω
which is required for the demand shocks to have a strong influence, the data clearly prefer
significant demand shocks. Further, forward looking behavior is witnessed by the estimates
of αx and απ which are near zero across the samples. However, the main result of interest
in Table 4 is that after the break, the estimates of ρe and σe fall suggesting that even with
calibrated rigidities and a steady-state mark-up, the role of cost-push shocks is diminishing.
13In an earlier version of this paper, a two-step maximum likelihood procedure was employed that fixed
the values of θ and φ to obtain estimates of the remaining parameters, and then conditional upon those
estimates the likelihood was maximized again with respect to θ and φ. In a still earlier version, a simulated
method of moments procedure following Gourieroux et al. (1993) was employed. In both of these versions
the results were qualitatively the same as those reported here.
14The value of β was held fixed at 0.99 in all of the results presented in this section.
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Next, in order to verify whether the influence of utilization on inflation is diminishing,
the composite parameter ψ is included in the list of estimated parameters. The results in
Table 16 of Appendix B suggest a decreasing estimate of ψ and ρe, however the estimate
of σe increases in the post-break sample. In this model the cost-push shocks compete with
technology and Taylor rule shocks, and it seems that some of the variation is captured by
σe, however the autoregressive parameter ρe is insignificant. Finally, both Tables 15 and 16
suggest the Taylor rule be modelled in differenced form as the estimates of ρr across samples
are near unity.
Table 17 of Appendix B presents the estimation results when θ and φ are included in the
list of estimated parameters with a Taylor rule in differenced form. The results suggest a
decreasing mark-up from 40% to 12%; however even though a decrease is observed across the
break in the estimate of φ, the pre- and post-break estimates are not statistically different
from one another. In addition Table 17 suggests a much larger post-break estimate of ρθ
and σθ than in Tables 15 and 16, which is to be weighed against the fact that the likelihoods
of the model are significantly different, and that the estimate of σθ is still dominated by the
estimate of σz.
Overall, the estimation results suggest that at the very least the influence of the cost-
push shock may be disappearing, which suggests increasingly competitive behavior. Next,
the model estimates suggest, albeit to a much smaller extent, that the role of nominal
rigidities may also be diminishing. Finally, the model estimates suggest a strong role for
demand and technology shocks and that forward-looking behavior may be prevalent in the
data. Taken as a whole it would seem that, conditional upon the activities of the Bank of
Canada as represented by a Taylor rule, a better characterization of the Canadian economy
may be one that has flexible prices and competitive market structures. Indeed, the model
estimates presented here along with recent Canadian economic history, summarized above,
may suggest a move towards a real business characterization. Such a transition would not
only imply a change in the sort of shocks that drive the business cycle but perhaps also
aggregate economic policy.
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3.6 CONCLUSION
In recent years high capacity utilization levels have existed without corresponding in-
creases in inflation. In Canada aggregate capacity utilization rates are based on business
surveys, thereby making the Canadian case of high utilization-low inflation of particular
interest. This chapter first determined some stylized facts about the relationship in recent
years, namely that there are breaks over time in the relationship and that at the very least
utilization has a decreasing effect on inflation through time. Given these facts, the conjec-
ture that a move towards increasingly competitive market structures and flexible prices may
have caused a deterioration in the relationship, was explained and evaluated within a New
Keynesian general equilibrium model.
This chapter is part of an emerging trend in the New Keynesian literature, that of
attempting to model jointly the advantages offered by ‘efficient’ shocks (that is, shocks to
demand and technology) in New Classical models and the advantages afforded by recognizing
non-Walrasian features of real world environments, such as those offered in this chapter.
Indeed in the inventive interpretation of the discussion in Clarida et al. (2000), Ireland
(2003) demonstrates that cost-push shocks are as, if not more, important than technology
shocks in explaining the joint behavior of U.S. output, inflation and interest rates. In that
chapter, a version of the above model is estimated to demonstrate that the link between New
Keynesian model environments and real business cycle models is slowly disintegrating, and a
new modeling paradigm emerging. The current analysis demonstrates an application of this
new emerging paradigm, an instance in which the Canadian economy may be tending away
from New Keynesian assumptions and towards characterizations provided by real business
cycles.
Finally, the analysis presented above could benefit from two particular extensions. The
first would include a richer specification for capital utilization following Greenwood et al.
(1988), possibly within the context of a small open economy. The main motivation for a
richer specification of the production technology would be to allow for increased realism with
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respect to variable capital utilization interacting with technology and cost-push shocks. An
open economy model may also be more suitable for the Canadian case. However this may
not prove to be of much interest given the exchange rate disconnect puzzle15 and the fact
that Clarida et al. (2000) find that, qualitatively, the solutions to various monetary-policy
design problems for the closed economy carry over to an open economy. Second, the analysis
may benefit from a richer role for the monetary authority as an institution who changes from
discretion to a rules based approach. These issues are left for continuing research that would
examine more closely the evolution of competitive market structures and flexible prices.
15See Obstfeld & Rogoff (2000).
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APPENDIX A
EXPERIMENT INSTRUCTIONS
There are two sets of balls that we will use in this experiment. This set has 7 black
balls and 3 white balls — we call this set of balls “more black”. This other set has 3 black
balls and 7 white balls - we call this set of balls “more white”. This experiment will last
for 6 rounds. Before we begin each round, we will randomly select one set to be used in
that round. We will place each set in a bag, and then put both bags into this box. We will
shake the box to mix up the bags, then select one of the bags. We will pour that set of
balls into the covered bingo cage. Both sets have an equal chance to be selected.
Once the set of balls is placed in the bingo cage, you will fill in the first line of the chart
on your record sheet that says, “I think the chance that the bingo cage contains “more
black” is ___ % and the chance that it contains “more white” is ___ %”. Since the
“more black” and “more white” sets are the only possibilities, your two numbers should
add up to 100%. Then, we will draw one ball from the bingo cage and announce what color
it is. On the line for “Draw #1” on your record sheet, you should circle the color of the
ball and then fill in the chance percentage boxes in that line. After everyone has recorded
his or her answers, we will replace the ball in the bingo cage and draw again. There will be
10 draws in each round. At the end of the round, we will uncover the bingo cage to reveal
which set of balls was used.
First, to practice, we will demonstrate the drawing procedure in person here in the front
of the room. For the actual experiment, you will see a videotape of the same procedures,
which we recorded earlier.
After all 6 rounds have been completed, we will calculate your payment. You will be
paid $5 for attending the experiment. In addition you have the opportunity to win a $10
bonus payment, based on the chance numbers you reported during the experiment. At the
end of the experiment, we will choose one draw from one round to determine the bonus
bet. There are two bets you may play to win the bonus payment: the “Dice Bet” or the
“Ping Pong Ball Set Bet”. You will play whichever bet has the greater chance of winning
for you.
For the “Dice Bet”, we will randomly select a “Lucky Number” from 51 to 100 from a
set of numbered balls in the bingo cage. Then we will roll 2 ten sided dice to get a number
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from 1 to 100. If the number rolled on the dice is less than or equal to the “Lucky Number”
then you win the bonus payment. The chances of winning this bet are exactly the value
of the Lucky Number. For example, if the Lucky number is 75, then you win the bonus
payment if we roll a number from 1 to 75, and lose if we roll a number from 76 to 100.
Therefore you have exactly a 75% chance of winning this bet.
For the “Ping Pong Ball Set Bet”, the computer will randomly select a round and draw
from the experiment to determine your payment. If you correctly predicted which set of
ping pong balls were used in that round, you will win the bonus payment. For example,
if in the selected round and draw, you had entered the chance for the set being the “More
Black Set” as 80% and the “More White Set” as 20%. Then if the set was actually the
“More Black Set” you win the bonus payment and if the set was actually the “More White
Set” you lose.
Note that you have the best chance of winning the bonus prize if you write down the
most accurate chance percentages in each round that you can. This will guarantee that
you will play the bet with the highest probability of winning the bonus payment.
There is to be no talking during the experiment. If you have any questions about how
this experiment works, please ask the experimenter.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics (Thousands of Dollars)
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
yit Overall 4303 7904 1 70892
Between 7234 6 51240
Within 3195 -18077 41357
xit Overall 3864 7168 2 63181
Between 6667 8 48124
Within 2642 -14937 38996
εit Overall 440 2895 -22716 24178
Between 1520 -10549 10342
Within 2464 -20875 22892
zit Overall 52707 80329 443 1335897
Between 77578 710 980118
Within 21001 -439344 408486
N 775
T 7
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Table 2: Yearly Correlations
1987 yi xi εi zi,−1 1988 yi xi εi zi,−1
yi 1 yi 1
xi 0.92 1 xi 0.93 1
εi 0.23 -0.15 1 εi 0.29 -0.07 1
zi,−1 0.65 0.61 0.14 1 zi,−1 0.64 0.59 0.19 1
1989 yi xi εi zi,−1 1990 yi xi εi zi,−1
yi 1 yi 1
xi 0.93 1 xi 0.94 1
εi 0.45 0.10 1 εi 0.58 0.29 1
zi,−1 0.63 0.62 0.22 1 zi,−1 0.59 0.59 0.26 1
1991 yi xi εi zi,−1 1992 yi xi εi zi,−1
yi 1 yi 1
xi 0.93 1 xi 0.91 1
εi 0.51 0.16 1 εi 0.35 -0.06 1
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Table 3: Overall Correlations
yit xit εit zit−1 yit−1 xit−1 εit−1
yit 1
xit 0.93 1
εit 0.43 0.07 1
zit−1 0.62 0.60 0.20 1
yit−1 0.88 0.86 0.28 0.60 1
xit−1 0.89 0.90 0.20 0.59 0.93 1
εit−1 0.23 0.14 0.28 0.18 0.44 0.09 1
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Table 4: Estimation Results I (Estimates)
Equation Coefficients Test Statistics
-Method α0 α1 α2 α3 α4 |m1| , |m2| R2
(1.4)-OLS 431.543 0.447 0.530
(112.100) (0.055) (0.061) 0.82
(1.4)-Within .. 0.070 0.313
.. (0.055) (0.066) 0.12
(1.4)-GMM 608.094 0.349 0.486 6.64, 1.55
(321.100) (0.069) (0.096) S = 521.5 0.80
(1.9)-OLS 279.625 0.413 0.576 -0.086 0.002
(78.340) (0.039) (0.034) (0.038) (0.001) 0.89
(1.9)-Within .. -0.019 0.504 0.039 0.010
.. (0.038) (0.036) (0.034) (0.003) 0.40
(1.9)-GMM 193.287 0.271 0.627 -0.071 0.010 8.38, 0.17
(165.700) (0.067) (0.071) (0.047) (0.004) S = 536.1 0.88
(1.13)-OLS 167.525 0.254 -0.005
(114.000) (0.047) (0.002) 0.10
(1.13)-Within .. -0.034 -0.009
.. (0.046) (0.006) 0.02
(1.13)-GMM 1.296 0.214 -0.001 8.49, 0.28
(217.100) (0.059) (0.003) S = 367.6 0.08
(1.16)-OLS 0.216 0.110 0.002
(0.121) (0.057) (0.001) 0.08
(1.16)-Within .. -0.109 0.002
.. (0.054) (0.001) 0.03
(1.16)-GMM 0.239 -0.061 0.002 1.55, 0.09
(0.148) (0.035) (0.001) S = 271.7 0.05
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Table 5: Estimation Results I (Hypothesis Tests)
Equation F ∗ F at .95 Accept H0?
(1.4)-OLS 1.38 3.84 Yes
(1.4)-Within 174.58 3.84 No
(1.4)-GMM 7.22 3.84 No
(1.9)-OLS 117.11 2.37 No
(1.9)-Within 351.62 2.37 No
(1.9)-GMM 43.68 2.37 No
(1.13)-OLS 25.65 3.00 No
(1.13)-Within 1.76 3.00 Yes
(1.13)-GMM 6.44 3.00 No
(1.16)-OLS 29.96 3.00 No
(1.16)-Within 8.93 3.00 No
(1.16)-GMM 7.38 3.00 No
Table 6: Estimation Results II
Equation Coefficients Test Statistics
α0 α1 α2 α3 ρ B −W F ∗, R2
(1.18) 300.881 -0.666 0.596 0.211 2.07 F ∗ = 64.98
(137.212) (0.019) (0.021) R2 = 0.18
(1.20) 15.684 0.653 0.176 0.129 2.12 F ∗ = 791.04
(97.860) (0.009) (0.009) R2 = 0.87
(1.22) 625.970 0.784 0.143 2.04 F ∗ = 667.22
(95.510) (0.006) R2 = 0.87
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Table 7: Estimation Results III
Global Regime 1: zt < $104m Regime 2: zt ≥ $104m
Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err.
Shipment Threshold:
β0 231.206 35.411 333.195 34.027 1119.092 262.491
β1 0.844 0.012 0.750 0.018 0.841 0.019
(R2, N) (0.87, 5425) (0.78, 4703) (0.80,722)
Threshold Estimate 95% C.I.: ($100.02m− $113.41m)
Absolute Forecast Error Threshold:
Regime 1: |xt − yt| < $10.49m Regime 2: |xt − yt| ≥ $10.49
β0 231.206 35.411 47.135 24.935 10763.94 1989.78
β1 0.844 0.012 0.897 0.009 0.462 0.052
(R2, N) (0.87, 5425) (0.91,5313) (0.29, 112)
Threshold Estimate 95% C.I.: ($10.27m− $11.02m)
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Table 8: Equation (2.10) Estimation Results
Treatment A Treatment B Treatment C
Est. Std. Err. |t| Est. Std. Err. |t| Est. Std. Err. |t|
α0 0.326 0.027 11.960 0.208 0.018 11.410 0.281 0.031 9.010
α1 0.805 0.041 19.450 0.764 0.034 22.800 0.919 0.037 24.750
α2 0.117 0.048 2.450 0.058 0.034 1.710 0.181 0.052 3.520
α3 -0.486 0.056 8.620 -0.371 0.038 9.720 -0.504 0.059 8.530
α4 -0.239 0.052 4.590 0.003 0.043 0.070 -0.289 0.061 4.710
α5 0.109 0.053 2.050 0.183 0.040 4.590 -0.023 0.044 0.510
N 23 29 20
R2 0.576 0.542 0.674
HF0 (4.400, 0.000) (3.260, 0.000) (1.830, 0.016)
H10 (181.000, 0.000) (57.330, 0.000) (159.480, 0.000)
H20 (12.330, 0.000) (21.81, 0.000) (7.400, 0.001)
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Table 9: Equation (2.22) Estimation Results
Treatment A Treatment B Treatment C
Est. Std. Err. |t| Est. Std. Err. |t| Est. Std. Err. |t|
β0 0.292 0.026 11.200 0.205 0.018 11.530 0.256 0.030 8.610
β1 0.703 0.042 16.690 0.732 0.034 21.570 0.844 0.037 22.900
β21 0.096 0.046 2.070 0.032 0.034 0.930 0.138 0.048 2.900
β22 0.330 0.063 5.270 0.116 0.044 2.640 0.335 0.062 5.410
β23 0.450 0.109 4.120 0.073 0.079 0.920 0.333 0.097 3.420
β31 -0.249 0.061 4.050 -0.260 0.043 6.030 -0.251 0.063 3.970
β32 -0.442 0.074 6.000 -0.435 0.050 8.640 -0.532 0.075 7.100
β33 -0.652 0.124 5.250 -0.541 0.078 6.890 -1.014 0.154 6.580
β41 -0.410 0.075 5.460 -0.042 0.055 0.770 -0.345 0.090 3.830
β42 -0.156 0.086 1.810 0.020 0.073 0.270 -0.241 0.095 2.530
β43 0.017 0.167 0.100 0.222 0.231 0.960 0.143 0.195 0.730
β5 0.161 0.054 2.990 0.208 0.040 5.210 0.051 0.043 1.200
N 23 29 20
R2 0.579 0.545 0.679
HF0 (4.380, 0.000) (3.330, 0.000) (1.660, 0.036)
H30 (14.070, 0.000) (14.710, 0.000) (10.550, 0.000)
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Table 10: Hypothesis Test Results Across Treatments
Treatment A Treatment B Treatment C
|z| Prob. > |z| |z| Prob. > |z| |z| Prob. > |z|
H40 29.960 0.000 29.043 0.000 27.574 0.000
H50 2.352 0.019 0.904 0.366 1.128 0.259
H60 5.194 0.000 8.222 0.000 4.473 0.000
H70 2.420 0.016 7.527 0.000 2.614 0.009
Table 11: Summary of Individual Hypothesis Test Results
Treatment < = >
H50 8/23 0/23 2/23
A H50 11/23 1/23 1/23
H70 7/23 1/23 1/23
H50 8/29 4/29 4/29
B H60 9/29 3/29 3/29
H70 7/29 3/29 3/29
H50 6/20 3/20 2/20
C H60 10/20 1/20 1/20
H70 6/20 3/20 1/20
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Table 12: Hansen (2000) Estimation Results
Backward Looking Model
1975QI-2002QIV 1975QI-1982QIV 1983QI-2002QIV
Est. Std. Err. |t| Est. Std. Err. |t| Est. Std. Err. |t|
α0 -8.418 5.037 1.671 2.329 7.843 0.297 -4.737 4.264 1.111
α1 0.108 0.060 1.789 0.066 0.087 0.761 0.069 0.051 1.344
α2 0.507 0.119 4.258 0.037 0.157 0.235 0.559 0.120 4.650
α3 0.378 0.113 3.356 0.084 0.148 0.564 0.077 0.097 0.792
α4 0.021 0.020 1.029 0.034 0.036 0.953 -0.010 0.013 0.760
Obs. 112 32 80
R2 0.819 0.034 0.491
Break Est.: 1982QIV
95% C. I.: 1982QII-1983QI
Mixture Model
1975QI-2002QIV 1975QI-1983QIV 1984QI-2002QIV
Est. Std. Err. |t| Est. Std. Err. |t| Est. Std. Err. |t|
α0 -13.185 3.303 3.992 -16.772 4.128 4.063 -7.234 4.591 1.576
α1 0.159 0.039 4.032 0.223 0.056 3.974 0.095 0.056 1.680
α2 0.058 0.125 0.466 -0.181 0.167 1.084 0.380 0.151 2.521
α3 -0.012 0.117 0.103 -0.111 0.131 0.844 -0.046 0.117 0.397
α4 0.899 0.133 6.773 1.069 0.199 5.359 0.391 0.126 3.110
α5 0.030 0.016 1.887 0.069 0.027 2.610 -0.006 0.013 0.464
Obs. 112 36 76
R2 0.877 0.616 0.589
Break Est.: 1983QIV
95% C. I.: 1982QII-1991QII
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Table 13: Bai and Perron (1998) Estimation Results
Backward Looking Model Mixture Model
Value 5% Crit. Value 5% Crit.
supF (0|k) Tests 0|1 27.389 18.230 0|1 27.594 20.080
0|2 28.945 15.620 0|2 25.730 17.370
0|3 34.047 13.930 0|3 30.552 15.580
0|4 32.312 12.380 0|4 41.677 13.900
0|5 27.737 10.520 0|5 32.983 11.940
Dmax Tests UDmax 34.047 18.420 UDmax 41.677 20.300
WDmax 48.065 19.960 WDmax 60.206 21.860
supF (k + 1|k) Tests 2|1 54.603 18.230 2|1 43.140 20.080
3|2 39.823 19.910 3|2 35.001 22.110
4|3 15.247 20.990 4|3 35.616 23.040
5|4 6.404 21.710 5|4 4.890 23.770
Sequential Breaks
Est. 95% C. I. Est. 95% C. I.
1st Break 1982QIV 1982QII 1983QII 1983QIV 1982QIV 1984QII
2nd Break 1991QI 1990QIII 1991QIII 1997QI 1996QI 1997QII
3rd Break .. .. .. 1991QI 1990QIII 1991QIV
82
Table 14: Kim and Nelson (1999) Estimation Results
Backward Looking Model Mixture Model
Std. Dev. of Est. Std. Err. |t| Std. Dev. of Est. Std. Err. |t|
α0 0.000 0.616 0.000 α0 0.000 0.250 4.687
α1 0.010 0.001 0.001 α1 0.000 0.003 0.000
α2 0.232 0.035 6.900 α2 0.083 0.040 0.000
α3 0.000 0.028 6.631 α3 0.000 0.019 2.067
α4 0.006 0.004 0.000 α4 0.177 0.037 0.000
σ 0.000 0.365 1.587 α5 0.005 0.004 4.747
σ 0.521 0.111 1.223
logL -179.680 logL -159.680
R2 0.666 LM 26.012 R2 0.767 LM 9.322
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Table 15: Maximum Likelihood Estimates I
1962QII-2003QI 1962QII-1984QII 1984QIII-2003QI
Est. Std. Err. |t| Est. Std. Err. |t| Est. Std. Err. |t|
ω 0.013 0.008 1.759 0.014 0.009 1.606 0.035 0.011 3.238
αx 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
απ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.085 0.070 1.206
ρr 1.032 0.037 28.241 1.020 0.031 32.667 0.939 0.017 55.817
ρπ 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.051 0.042 1.213
ρg 0.288 0.120 2.406 0.307 0.158 1.943 0.000 0.000 0.000
ρu 14.151 11.736 1.206 13.961 12.200 1.144 5.059 1.073 4.715
ρa 0.970 0.017 55.571 0.975 0.018 54.212 0.979 0.003 378.050
ρe 0.974 0.016 60.672 0.956 0.030 31.390 0.080 0.105 0.763
σa 0.108 0.059 1.843 0.132 0.089 1.488 0.060 0.009 6.786
σe 0.006 0.003 2.163 0.009 0.005 1.608 0.003 0.001 2.485
σz 0.009 0.000 17.679 0.010 0.001 12.976 0.007 0.001 11.703
σr 0.008 0.003 2.721 0.009 0.004 2.319 0.007 0.001 11.927
logL -1907.200 -1010.100 -902.970
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Table 16: Maximum Likelihood Estimates II
1962QII-2003QI 1962QII-1984QII 1984QIII-2003QI
Est. Std. Err. |t| Est. Std. Err. |t| Est. Std. Err. |t|
ω 0.012 0.008 1.511 0.017 0.015 1.168 0.000 0.000 0.000
ψ 6.752 4.515 1.496 8.229 5.516 1.492 0.002 0.001 1.778
αx 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.725 0.146 4.961
απ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.097 0.030
ρr 1.028 0.025 41.380 1.025 0.041 24.850 0.980 0.024 40.409
ρπ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.102 0.046 2.228
ρg 0.289 0.089 3.224 0.308 0.176 1.754 0.231 0.072 3.188
ρu 12.282 11.114 1.105 17.305 15.058 1.149 0.000 0.000 0.001
ρa 0.971 0.004 260.130 0.972 0.017 56.679 0.979 0.016 62.041
ρe 0.974 0.011 90.531 0.956 0.021 44.885 0.000 0.000 0.000
σa 0.114 0.013 8.775 0.121 0.067 1.803 0.096 0.068 1.400
σe 0.000 0.000 3.954 0.000 0.000 2.476 0.005 0.001 7.829
σz 0.009 0.001 16.608 0.010 0.001 13.002 0.004 0.001 3.048
σr 0.008 0.003 2.841 0.010 0.004 2.609 0.002 0.000 7.267
logL -1907.200 -1010.100 -929.760
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Table 17: Maximum Likelihood Estimates III
1962QII-2003QI 1962QII-1984QII 1984QIII-2003QI
Est. Std. Err. |t| Est. Std. Err. |t| Est. Std. Err. |t|
ω 0.017 0.018 0.958 0.015 0.018 0.844 0.035 0.026 1.365
θ 8.534 7.142 1.195 3.480 2.786 1.249 9.450 6.805 1.389
φ 71.880 30.144 2.385 47.016 8.571 5.485 41.139 12.534 3.282
αx 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
απ 0.000 0.010 0.037 0.197 0.079 2.493 0.000 0.000 0.001
ρπ 0.000 0.001 0.440 0.353 0.843 0.419 0.000 0.000 0.180
ρg 0.256 0.079 3.237 0.511 0.442 1.157 0.264 0.099 2.655
ρu 9.355 3.413 2.741 11.430 4.568 2.502 9.370 7.663 1.223
ρa 0.952 0.034 27.673 0.968 0.029 33.595 0.940 0.034 27.813
ρθ 0.978 0.017 58.175 0.958 0.050 19.247 0.952 0.009 103.450
σa 0.065 0.046 1.395 0.068 0.059 1.141 0.057 0.029 1.972
σθ 0.005 0.000 1.349 0.005 0.005 0.462 0.007 0.000 5.352
σz 0.009 0.001 17.035 0.007 0.001 12.074 0.010 0.001 12.283
σr 0.007 0.001 5.569 0.015 0.007 2.095 0.008 0.002 3.179
logL -1848.400 -962.350 -896.580
Mark-up 13.273% 40.326% 11.834%
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APPENDIX C
FIGURES
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January 1999
Figure 1: Survey Phases
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Figure 2: 1986(a), xit vs. yit
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Figure 3: 1986(b), xit vs. yit
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Figure 4: 1987(a), xit vs. yit
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Figure 5: 1987(b), xit vs. yit
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Figure 6: 1988(a), xit vs. yit
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Figure 7: 1988(b), xit vs. yit
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Figure 8: 1989(a), xit vs. yit
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Figure 9: 1989(b), xit vs. yit
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Figure 10: 1990(a), xit vs. yit
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Figure 11: 1990(b), xit vs. yit
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Figure 12: 1991(a), xit vs. yit
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Figure 13: 1991(b), xit vs. yit
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Figure 14: 1992(a), xit vs. yit
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Figure 15: 1992(b), xit vs. yit
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Figure 16: 1986(a), εit vs. i
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Figure 17: 1986(b), εit vs. i
104
-25000
-20000
-15000
-10000
-5000
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
Plants
E
xp
ec
ta
ti
on
s 
E
rr
or
Figure 18: 1987(a), εit vs. i
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Figure 19: 1987(b), εit vs. i
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Figure 20: 1988(a), εit vs. i
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Figure 21: 1988(b), εit vs. i
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Figure 22: 1989(a), εit vs. i
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Figure 23: 1989(b), εit vs. i
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Figure 24: 1990(a), εit vs. i
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Figure 25: 1990(b), εit vs. i
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Figure 26: 1991(a), εit vs. i
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Figure 27: 1991(b), εit vs. i
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Figure 28: 1992(a), εit vs. i
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Figure 29: 1992(b), εit vs. i
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Bayesian Conservative Confirmation Bias
Figure 31: Theoretical Regression Lines
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Figure 32: Treatment A, Round 1
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Figure 33: Treatment A, Round 2
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Figure 34: Treatment A, Round 3
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Figure 35: Treatment A, Round 4
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Figure 36: Treatment A, Round 5
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Figure 37: Treatment A, Round 6
124
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
L D D L L L L D L L
Bayesian Data Average
Figure 38: Treatment C, Round 1
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Figure 39: Treatment C, Round 2
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Figure 40: Treatment C, Round 3
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Figure 41: Treatment C, Round 4
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Figure 42: Treatment C, Round 5
129
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
D D L L L L L D D L
Bayesian Data Average
Figure 43: Treatment C, Round 6
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Figure 44: Treatment B, Round 1
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Figure 45: Treatment B, Round 2
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Figure 46: Treatment B, Round 3
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Figure 47: Treatment B, Round 4
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Figure 48: Treatment B, Round 5
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Figure 49: Treatment B, Round 6
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Figure 50: Treatment A Estimated Regression Lines
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Figure 51: Treatment C Estimated Regression Lines
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Figure 52: Treatment B Estimated Regression Lines
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Figure 53: Treatment A Bubble Plot
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Figure 54: Treatment C Bubble Plot
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Figure 55: Treatment B Bubble Plot
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Figure 56: Inflation and utilization for 1975QI-2002QIV
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Figure 57: πt and πet for 1975QI-2002QIV
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Figure 58: Output Gap and capacity utilization for 1975QI-2002QIV
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Figure 59: Time varying α1t
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Figure 60: Conditional Variances
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Figure 61: Forecast Errors
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Figure 62: One-Shot Probabilities, No Autocorrelation (1982QII-1995QI)
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Figure 63: One-Shot Probabilities, AR(1) Errors (1982QII-1995QI)
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